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I.

INTRODUCTION

This article traces the origins of the oral deposition1 in the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure (“Federal Rules”) with an emphasis on the role
of the officer in charge of the deposition. In Parts II and III, I document
the origins of the deposition, drawing on published sources. In Parts IV
and V, I draw upon unpublished sources regarding the 1930s Advisory
Committee’s decision not to provide for a judicial officer who would
have the authority to rule on the admissibility of evidence during the
deposition. That decision was an important, yet overlooked, element in
the shaping of modern American civil procedure, including the
displacement of civil trial by pretrial discovery.
A striking attribute of the modern American deposition is that
opposing counsel conduct the questioning in the absence of a judicial
officer.2 The Advisory Committee that drafted the 1938 Federal Rules
considered a proposal to provide deponents, both party and non-party
witnesses, with the option of requesting a master to rule on the
admissibility of evidence at the pretrial examination. According to
archival sources, members of the Advisory Committee concluded that the
systemic disadvantages of that proposal outweighed the advantages.3
I describe the historical origins of three salient features of the
deposition: the near-absence of the rules of evidence; the presence of an
“officer in charge” 4 who has no power to rule on the admissibility of
evidence; and the breadth of the permitted scope of inquiry.5 I discuss
1

See FED. R. CIV. P. 30 (governing the taking of oral depositions). Although oral
examination for discovery exists in non-American jurisdictions, including Canada, “[t]he
oral deposition is an American innovation that remains uniquely characteristic of
American civil procedure.” JOHN H. LANGBEIN, RENÉE LETTOW LERNER, BRUCE P.
SMITH, HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW: THE DEVELOPMENT OF ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL
INSTITUTIONS 395 (2009).
2
See David J. Gerber, Extraterritorial Discovery and the Conflict of Procedural
Systems: Germany and the United States, 34 AM. J. COMP. L. 745, 752 (1986) (describing
the international controversy that results when American lawyers take depositions in
Germany).
3
See, infra, Part V.C.
4
See FED. R. CIV. P. 30(c) (1938) (amended 1972) (“The officer before whom the
deposition is to be taken . . . .”).
5
The expansive scope of pretrial discovery has displaced many trials by clarifying
factual issues before trial. See John H. Langbein, The Disappearance of Civil Trial in
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why the term “officer” is misleading: the examination is conducted
entirely by adverse parties in the absence of a judge or a judge-like
figure.6 The officer in charge is simply a stenographer or notary public
who swears in the deponent and records the testimony; he or she
exercises no adjudicatory function.7
The modern American deposition serves two primary functions.
The deposition permits a party to preserve potential testimony for
introduction at trial: a preservation of potential testimony function. The
deposition is also a tool for investigating potential evidence before trial:
an investigation of potential evidence function. Counsel orally questions
an adverse witness, and the officer in charge of the deposition records the
testimony verbatim. Unless the deponent will be unavailable at trial, the
purpose of this deposition is to provide discovery to the party and not to
supply trial testimony. At equity, “deposition” signified testimony taken
by a court-appointed officer, based on party-propounded written
interrogatories.8 “[T]his ex parte procedure was the primary vehicle for
bringing witness testimony before the court.”9
In Part II, I describe the discovery devices available in the federal
courts just prior to the coming into force of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. In Part III, I discuss the role of the officer in charge of
pretrial oral examinations in England and in the United States, and the
the United States, 122 YALE L.J. 522 (2012). Also, the high cost of discovery practice has
promoted settlements. See generally ROBERT P. BURNS, THE DEATH OF THE AMERICAN
TRIAL (2009); ELLEN E. SWARD, THE DECLINE OF THE CIVIL JURY (2001). See also Stephen
N. Subrin, Discovery in Global Perspective: Are We Nuts?, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 299, 301–
02 (2002) (noting the breadth of permitted discovery and the infrequency of trial in the
American system). The nearly unlimited right of discovery under the Federal Rules has
also been blamed for impeding access to the legal system. See Jack B. Weinstein, After
Fifty Years of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Are the Barriers to Justice Being
Raised?, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1901, 1906 (1989).
6
There does exist a role for the judge: overseeing pretrial conferences under Federal
Rule 16; limiting the scope of the examination by granting protective orders pursuant to
Rule 30(d); issuing sanctions under Rule 37; and generally settling discovery disputes
between parties.
7
For the sake of consistency, I use the term “officer” to describe the person who
swears in the examinant and records his testimony.
8
See WILLIAM HEATH BENNET, A DISSERTATION ON THE NATURE OF THE VARIOUS
PROCEEDINGS IN THE MASTERS’ OFFICE IN THE COURT OF CHANCERY 12 (1834) (“[W]here
the master decides . . . that witnesses are proper to be examined, the interrogatories for
their examination are prepared and signed by counsel.”) (emphasis removed).
9
Amalia D. Kessler, Our Inquisitorial Tradition: Equity Procedure, Due Process,
and the Search for an Alternative to the Adversarial, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1181, 1206
(2005). As a result of this historical distinction, I will employ “oral examination for
discovery” to refer to a pretrial deposition that is for the purpose of discovery rather than
for gathering proof.
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origins of permitting parties to conduct the examination. Part IV
discusses the Advisory Committee that drafted the 1938 Rules and
describes the expansion of discovery under those rules. In Part V, I
examine the Committee’s deliberations regarding the role of the officer
in charge of the oral deposition, and in particular whether that person
should have the power to rule on the admissibility of evidence. In Part
VI, I conclude by setting forth the origins of the oral deposition in the
Federal Rules and suggesting that the creation of liberal discovery
contributed to the decline of civil trial. I include, at Appendix A, the
draft rules (both published and unpublished) regarding the option, at a
party’s request, of having a master with the power to rule on the
admissibility of evidence appointed to be in charge of the deposition. At
Appendix B I sketch out the early origins of oral, as opposed to written,
party-administered pretrial examination for discovery in Ontario – a
jurisdiction that permitted such a procedure several years before New
York’s Field Code authorized pretrial discovery of adversary parties.
II. DISCOVERY IN THE FEDERAL COURTS JUST PRIOR TO THE FEDERAL
RULES OF 1938
A. Introduction
Before 1938, when the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (the
“Rules”) came into force, pretrial discovery was limited in cases at both
law and equity in the federal courts.10 In actions at law, there was no
right to pretrial oral examination of parties or witnesses for discovery
purposes, even if the law of the state in which the court sat did permit
such procedures.11 The Supreme Court had held that only federal, rather
10
See Stephen N. Subrin, Fishing Expeditions Allowed: The Historical Background
of the 1938 Federal Discovery Rules, 39 B.C. L. REV. 691, 698–701 (1998) (describing
pretrial discovery in the federal courts before the Rules were implemented).
11
6 JAMES WM. MOORE AT AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 26 App. 100 (Daniel
R. Coquillette et al. eds., 3d ed. 2011) (citing Ex Parte Fiske, 113 U.S. 713, 719–20
(1885) (limiting the effect of both the Conformity Act and the Rules of Decision Act by
holding that federal law prescribed the only procedure for obtaining evidence for trial at
law in the federal courts)). See also Gimenes v. New York & Porto Rico S. S. Co., 37
F.2d 168, 169 (S.D.N.Y. 1929) (“It is regrettable that in the period between the
commencement of an action on the law side of this court – or the removal of a law action
from the state court to this court – and the trial of the case, this court is unable to do much
to facilitate the preparation of either party for trial.”). 28 U.S.C. § 634 (1928) (amended
1988) provided that “in causes pending at law and in equity in the district courts of the
United States, it shall be lawful to take the depositions or testimony of witnesses in the
manner prescribed by the laws of the State in which the courts are held,” but the Supreme
Court held that this statute merely regulated the mode of taking depositions and did not

48

SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW

[Vol. 10:43

than state, statutes could authorize oral examination for discovery in
actions at law, and that federal statutes did not permit oral examination
for discovery.12
Edson R. Sunderland, the University of Michigan Law School
professor who drafted the Rules regarding discovery, 13 stated in 1938
that, prior to the Rules, there were “just four sources [of] authority for
any proceeding involving discovery before trial in the federal courts”:
two federal statutes and two equity rules.14 The discovery devices that
the two statutes 15 authorized, however, served the preservation of
potential testimony function and not the investigation of potential
evidence function. Of the two rules of equity, 16 one was “the only
provision in the entire federal system intended for discovery,” according
to Sunderland.17

enlarge the grounds for taking so as to allow examinations before trial for purposes of
discovery in accordance with state practice. Hanks Dental Ass’n v. Int’l Tooth Crown
Co., 194 U.S. 303, 308 (1904).
12
28 U.S.C. § 635 (1928) (amended 1990) (“[T]he mode of proof in the trial of
actions at common law shall be by oral testimony and examination of witnesses in open
court except as hereinafter provided.”); Hanks Dental Ass’n, 194 U.S. at 309 (citing
National Cash Register Co. v. Leland, 94 F. 502 (1st Cir. 1899) (holding that 28 U.S.C.
§ 635 prohibits both serving interrogatories upon an adverse party as well as oral
examination of parties and witnesses in advance of the trial, except when permitted by
federal statutes), cert. denied, 175 U.S. 724 (1899)). Some federal courts sitting in states
that permitted more liberal discovery than did the federal statutes nevertheless
occasionally followed the state procedure in circumstances that were arguably not
contemplated by the federal statutes. See generally Anderson v. Mackay, 46 F. 105
(S.D.N.Y. 1891) (permitting a party to obtain an order for the examination of an
adversary to enable the party to frame pleadings when such an order was provided for by
state statute); Donnelly v. Anderson Brown & Co., 275 F. 438 (S.D.N.Y. 1921)
(permitting, pursuant to state practice, an examination to frame a pleading because such
an examination differed from the preservation of testimony for proof at trial and because
the federal statute did not provide for that contingency, state practice should prevail);
Heister v. Lehigh & N.E.R. Co., 50 F.2d 928 (S.D.N.Y. 1931) (permitting an examination
to aid in the framing of a bill of particulars on grounds similar to Donnelly).
13
Charles E. Clark, Edson Sunderland and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 58
MICH. L. REV. 6, 10 (1959) (“Thus with the Chairman’s approval I was able to
commission Edson to prepare the draft of that part of the rules known originally as “V.
DEPOSITIONS, DISCOVERY AND SUMMARY JUDGMENTS.”“).
14
Edson R. Sunderland, The New Federal Rules, 45 W. VA. L.Q. 5, 19 (1938).
Sunderland delivered this address to the West Virginia Bar Association on August 20,
1938. Id. at 5.
15
28 U.S.C. §§ 639(1928) (amended 1968), 644 (1928) (amended 1997).
16
FED. EQ. R. 47, 58.
17
Sunderland, supra note 14, at 20.
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B. Federal Statutes Permitting Depositions to Preserve Testimony
The two federal statutes authorized and governed the use of the
deposition de bene esse 18 and the deposition pursuant to a dedimus
potestatem. 19 The de bene esse provision permitted the taking of a
deposition before trial when the witness might not be available to testify
at trial. The deposition de bene esse, which did not require an
application to the court, could be taken only if the witness:
1) was ancient or infirm, 2) lived more than 100 miles from the
place of trial, 3) was bound on a voyage to sea, 4) was about to
leave the United States, or 5) was out of the district where the
case was to be tried and more than 100 miles from the place of
trial, before the time of trial.20

The dedimus potestatem provision supplemented the de bene esse statute,
by permitting the taking of a deposition when such a deposition was
necessary in order “to prevent a failure or delay of justice.” 21 Any
federal court could grant a dedimus to take a deposition, but the moving
party had to make a showing:
1) that the issue had been joined in a pending action, 2) that a
dedimus was necessary to prevent a failure or delay of justice, 3)
that the witness was beyond the reach of the court’s process, 4)
that the testimony could not be taken de bene esse pursuant to
notice, and 5) that the application was made in good faith and not
merely for discovery purposes.22

Both of these statutes applied to actions at law or at equity, but the
depositions that these two statutes authorized were only available under
limited circumstances. Unlike the post-1938 deposition, which merged
the preservation of potential testimony function and the investigation of

18

28 U.S.C. § 639 (1928) (amended 1968).
28 U.S.C. § 644 (1928) (amended 1997). A dedimus historically had been a “writ
or commission out of chancery empowering one to do a specific act, such as
administering an oath to a defendant and recording the defendant’s answers to questions.”
Subrin, supra note 10, at 698.
20
6 MOORE, supra note 11 (citations omitted).
21
Sunderland, supra note 14, at 19.
22
6 MOORE, supra note 11 (citations omitted). The requirement, under § 644, that
the deposition must be held according to “common usage” constituted a further restriction
on the usefulness of the statute for discovery purposes. The Supreme Court held in 1885
that a party seeking disclosure in advance of trial was restricted to the procedure
prescribed by federal law for obtaining evidence for trial at law in the federal courts. See
supra, note 11.
19
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potential evidence function, the de bene esse deposition served only the
preservation of potential testimony function.
C. Rules of Equity Permitting Depositions and Discovery
1. Depositions at Equity
Federal Equity Rules 47 and 58 governed discovery in cases at
equity. Federal Equity Rule 47, enacted in 1912, provided for taking the
deposition of a witness.23 The 1912 Federal Equity Rules required oral
testimony in open court,24 replacing the traditional equitable procedure of
using documents and written testimony. 25 Rule 47 thus permitted a
departure from the general requirement of oral testimony, but the
deposition that the Rule permitted was a means of gathering evidence for
trial.26
2. Three Equitable Discovery Devices
i. Documentary Discovery
Federal Equity Rule 58 codified the traditional bill of discovery
available in equity.27 Under Rule 58, a party could move for a judicial

23
GEORGE FREDERICK RUSH, THE ESSENTIALS OF EQUITY PLEADING AND PRACTICE
221 (1913) (citing FED. EQ. R. 47 (1912) (“The court, upon application of either party,
when allowed by statute, or for good and exceptional cause for departing from the
general rule, to be shown by affidavit, may permit the deposition of named witnesses.”)).
24
RUSH, supra note 23, at 220–21 (citing FED. R. EQ. 46 (“In all trials in equity the
testimony of witnesses shall be taken orally in open court, except as otherwise provided
by statute or these rules.”)). Blackstone had approved of the common law’s requirement
of oral testimony over equity’s written approach: “This open examination of witnesses
viva voce, in the presence of all mankind, is much more conducive to the clearing up of
truth, than the private and secret examination taken down in writing before an officer, or
his clerk . . . .” 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 373
(University of Chicago Press 1979) (1765). For subsequent commentary, see CHARLES
BARTON, AN HISTORICAL TREATISE OF A SUIT IN EQUITY, IN WHICH IS ATTEMPTED A
SCIENTIFIC DEDUCTION OF THE PROCEEDINGS USED ON THE EQUITY SIDES OF THE COURTS
OF CHANCERY AND EXCHEQUER, FROM THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE SUIT TO THE DECREE
AND APPEAL 156–58 n.1 (London, W. Clark & Son, 1796) (stating that oral testimony is
superior because “the very manner of the witness giving evidence is not unfrequently
[sic] a sufficient indication of the truth or falsity of his testimony, an advantage entirely
lost in the Courts of Equity”).
25
For an assessment of the 1912 Federal Equity Rules, see Robert H. Talley, The
New and Old Federal Equity Rules Compared, 18 VA. L. REV. 663 (1913).
26
“The purpose here [Federal Equity Rule 47] was not discovery but obtaining
proof.” Sunderland, supra note 14, at 20.
27
See discussion, infra Part II.D.
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order that would allow the party “to effect the inspection or production of
documents in the possession of either party and containing evidence
material to the cause of action or defense of his adversary.”28 Consistent
with the principle that discovery was meant to help a litigant prove his
case, but not to explore his adversary’s evidence, 29 documentary
discovery under Rule 58 was limited to discovering facts concerning the
requesting party’s own case, but not the adversary’s case.30
ii. Requests for Admission
Federal Equity Rule 58 allowed a party to request from the
adversary, before trial, a written admission of “the execution or
genuineness of any document, letter or other writing.”31 This provision
was of limited value. Stephen Subrin has observed that “one would have
to know in advance about the writing to seek the admission, and . . . there
was only limited discovery as to this.”32
iii.Written Interrogatories
A written interrogatory was a party-propounded set of questions
that was administered to the adversary before trial. Rule 58 authorized a
party to require a written interrogatory of an adversary for the discovery
of “facts and documents material to the support or defense of the
cause.”33
The written interrogatory available under Rule 58 was, according to
Sunderland, “very inadequate” as a method of discovery.34 As with the
documentary discovery provision, a party could only use written
interrogatories to determine facts related to the propounding party’s case,
28

RUSH, supra note 23, at 225 (quoting FED. EQ. R. 58).
See Martin Conboy, Depositions, Discovery and Summary Judgments: As Dealt
with in Title V of the Proposed Rules of Civil Procedure for the Federal Courts, 22
A.B.A. J. 881, 882 (1936) (noting “the traditional idea that in Chancery the right of a
party to a discovery did not extend to all facts material to the issue, but was limited to
such material facts as were necessary to establish his cause of action or defense”).
30
Sunderland thus noted that such discovery was “good for attack but not for
defense.” Sunderland, supra note 14, at 21. Another restriction on the use of
documentary discovery was that, under Rule 58, “the party seeking an inspection of
documents was required to obtain an admission from the adverse party that the
documents were in his possession, custody, or control before the court would make an
order for their production.” 7 MOORE, supra note 11, § 34 App. 100.
31
RUSH, supra note 23, at 225.
32
Subrin, supra note 10, at 700.
33
RUSH, supra note 23, at 224.
34
Sunderland, supra note 14, at 20 (noting in addition that written interrogatories
“are almost useless in many cases and are effective in none but the most simple matters”).
29
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and only from an adverse party, not witnesses. Written interrogatories
were of limited value because the questioner could not adjust his
questions to follow up on the answers he received. Judge Learned Hand
criticized the efficiency of written interrogatories in 1917: “A much more
convenient way [to permit discovery] would be to . . . allow . . . an oral
examination.”35
There was an important difference between written interrogatory
practice under the Equity Rules and oral deposition practice under the
later Federal Rules: at equity, an examiner who was independent and
neutral with respect to the parties administered the interrogatory and
recorded the testimony; 36 at the oral deposition, counsel for the party
seeking discovery was authorized to ask the adversary questions.37
D. Equitable Bill of Discovery at Common Law
While the Federal Equity Rules applied to trials at equity but not at
law, a litigant in federal court was permitted to bring a bill of discovery
at equity to obtain discovery in an action at law.38 The federal courts
were reluctant to grant these requests because such discovery was
available only when an “adequate remedy at law” to compel
documentary discovery was lacking.39 Although an 1861 federal statute
35
Pressed Steel Car Co. v. Union Pac. R. R. Co., 241 Fed. 964, 967 (S.D.N.Y. 1917).
After recognizing that he “cannot compel” an oral examination of an adversary before
trial, Judge Hand speculated that “the same result [an effective method of discovery] may
probably be obtained, though it must be confessed with the maximum of expense in time
and labor, by allowing interrogatories to be renewed as often as justice requires.” Id.
36
Kessler, supra note 9, at 1216–17; 3 SIMON GREENLEAF, A TREATISE ON THE LAW
OF EVIDENCE 364 (16th ed. 1899) (“[A]ccording to the course of chancery, the testimony
of the witness is taken upon interrogatories in writing, deliberately propounded to him by
the examiner . . . .”).
37
For an account of the origins of the practice of allowing a party, rather than a
court-appointed examiner, to conduct the examination, see discussion, infra, Part III.
38
In 1917 Judge Learned Hand described the proper procedure for a bill of discovery
in aid of an action at law after Federal Equity Rule 58 came into force in 1912:
[T]he proper practice in a bill of discovery is now as follows: The plaintiff
will plead those facts which entitle him to a discovery from the defendant,
and will annex such interrogatories as he wishes the defendant to answer. If
the defendant does not dispute the plaintiff’s right to some discovery, but
objects to some or all of the actual interrogatories annexed to the bill, he
will make those objections under Rule 58, and bring them on for hearing
before the judge. He is not subject to the rule that, by answering one, he
must answer all. If, on the other hand, he disputes the plaintiff’s right to any
discovery, he will plead in an answer such facts as he deems apposite, and
obtain from the court, under Rule 58, an enlargement of his time to answer
the interrogatories until the plaintiff’s right to discovery is established.
Pressed Steel Car Co., 241 Fed. at 966–67.
39
United States v. Bitter Root Dev. Co., 200 U.S. 451, 472 (1906).
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incorporating Section 15 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 permitted courts of
law to compel the discovery of documents, the Supreme Court held in
1911 that the authorization to compel discovery of documents applied
only at trial and that, under the statute, pretrial documentary discovery
was not available.40
III. THE ROLE OF THE OFFICER IN CHARGE OF THE DEPOSITION AT
EQUITY
Under the 1938 Federal Rules, the officer in charge of conducting a
deposition was responsible for taking down testimony, but lacked
authority to do much else.41 In the respect that this officer functions as a
recorder of evidence, the person who presides over the modern American
oral deposition resembles the lay examiner appointed by the English
Court of Chancery to discharge an evidence-gathering function. The
English examiner orally administered a written, party-prepared
interrogatory upon an adverse party without the presence of counsel,
recorded a written summary of the examinant’s oral answers and
transmitted that record to the court. 42 In modern American practice
under the 1938 Rules, in contrast, counsel for the examining party asks
questions orally of the examinant, but the questioner does not record the
answers for the court.43
40
Carpenter v. Winn, 221 U.S. 533, 537–38 (1911) (citing U.S. REV. STAT. § 724, U.
S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 583) (“In the trial of actions at law, the courts of the United States
may, on motion and due notice thereof, require the parties to produce books or writings in
their possession or power, which contain evidence pertinent to the issue, in cases and
under circumstances where they might be compelled to produce the same by the ordinary
rules of proceeding in chancery. If a plaintiff fails to comply with such order, the court
may, on motion, give the like judgment for the defendant as in cases of nonsuit; and if a
defendant fails to comply with such order, the court may, on motion, give judgment
against him by default.”) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 636 (1934)); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1350
(corresponds to the Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 15, 1 Stat. 73) (“That all the said
courts of the United States, shall have power in the trial of actions at law, on motion and
due notice thereof being given, to require the parties to produce books or writings in their
possession or power, which contain evidence pertinent to the issue, in cases and under
circumstances where they might be compelled to produce the same by the ordinary rules
of proceeding in chancery.”). The Court recognized that the purpose of the statute was to
provide a “substitute for a bill of discovery in aid of a legal action,” but nevertheless
concluded that § 15 of the Judiciary Act only applied at trial. Carpenter, 221 U.S. at 537,
545.
41
See FED. R. CIV. P. 30(c) (1938) (“The officer before whom the deposition is to be
taken shall put the witness on oath and shall personally, or by some one acting under his
direction and in his presence, record the testimony of the witness. The testimony shall be
taken stenographically and transcribed unless the parties agree otherwise.”).
42
See, infra, Part III.A.
43
Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(c)(1).
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In order to understand the choices that the drafters of the Rules
made regarding regulating who would question witnesses and under what
conditions, it is helpful to review the pre-1938 English and American
practices with respect to the role of the officer in charge of the
examination, including the origin of permitting a party (or the party’s
counsel) to conduct the examination.
A. The English Examiner at Equity
The English Court of Chancery appointed examiners to gather
evidence for the court. 44 By the sixteenth century, the court was
employing lay examiners to gather evidence by administering partypropounded interrogatories.45 Beginning in the later sixteenth century,
lay examiners only took examinations in London and the immediate
vicinity, and by the middle of the seventeenth century, examination by
commission was the “norm outside of London.”46 By the seventeenth
century, the practice was for the parties to nominate four commissioners
each, from whom the court would select two of each. 47 Although
examination on commission “was still to be considered as examination
by persons authorised by and under the control of the court,” during the
seventeenth century “there was in Chancery . . . something of a shift
away from a view of commissioners as judicial officers, to one of them
as perhaps somewhat suspect party nominees.”48
Although a party or counsel drafted the interrogatory, the party did
not conduct the examination. Rather, the examination was conducted
outside the presence of parties and counsel.49 At the examination, the
44

JOHN G. HENDERSON, CHANCERY PRACTICE WITH ESPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE
OFFICE AND DUTIES OF MASTERS IN CHANCERY, REGISTERS, AUDITORS, COMMISSIONERS
IN CHANCERY, COURT COMMISSIONERS, MASTER COMMISSIONERS, REFEREES, ETC. 163
(1904). The court appointed examiners in part to relieve the court’s heavy workload. Id.
Early Chancery lawyers would have conceived of discovery as documents and testimony
that were produced to the court, rather to an adverse party. See Ian Eagles, Disclosure of
Material Obtained on Discovery, 47 MOD. L. REV. 284, 286 (1984).
45
JOHN P. DAWSON, A HISTORY OF LAY JUDGES 151 (1960); see MICHAEL R. T.
MACNAIR, THE LAW OF PROOF IN EARLY MODERN EQUITY 173 (1999) (stating that equity
followed the “principle that the examination of witnesses was to be by officers of the
court and not by the parties or their agents.”).
46
MACNAIR, supra note 45, at 173; see also DAWSON, supra note 45, at 151–59
(describing Chancery examinations both in London and in the country).
47
MACNAIR, supra note 45, at 174. Dawson states that in the sixteenth century the
Court of Chancery would “appoint a commission of four lay persons, two named by each
of the parties.” DAWSON, supra note 45, at 151–52.
48
Id. at 175–74.
49
ROBERT WYNESS MILLAR, CIVIL PROCEDURE OF THE TRIAL COURT IN HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVE 270 (1952).
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examiner or the commissioner propounded to the examinant questions
that had been prepared by the party seeking the evidence. The examiner
or commissioner then summarized the testimony in a report submitted to
the court.50
B. Examinations in the Federal Courts of Equity
1. General Method of Obtaining Proof
After the American Revolution, the equity side of the federal courts
continued the English practice of using court-appointed officers to
administer party-propounded written interrogatories to witnesses.
Although the Judiciary Act of 1789 prescribed that “[t]hat the mode of
proof by oral testimony and examination of witnesses in open court shall
be the same in all the courts of the United States, as well in the trial of
causes in equity . . . as of actions at common law,”51 the 1822 Federal
Equity Rules provided for the traditional Chancery method of obtaining
testimony.52 The 1912 amendments mandated that all testimony was to
be taken orally, in open court.53
2. Person Conducting the Examination
The 1842 Federal Equity Rules permitted a party (or the party’s
counsel), as opposed to a court-appointed officer, to conduct the
questioning during an examination. 54 This practice departed from the
traditional mode of examination at equity by permitting the courtappointed officer to conduct an oral examination rather than administer
written interrogatories. Consequently, the person asking the questions
could react to the witness’s answers and pose follow-up questions, and
not be constrained by the written interrogatory. Additionally, the parties
50

See Kessler, supra note 9, at 1207.
Judiciary Act of 1789, supra note 40, § 30, 1 Stat. 73, 88 (1789).
52
JAMES LOVE HOPKINS, THE NEW FEDERAL EQUITY RULES 40–41 (8th ed. 1933)
(citing FED. R. EQ. 25 (1822) (“Testimony may be taken according to the acts of
Congress, or under a commission.”) (replaced by FED. R. EQ. 81 (1912) (“Witnesses who
live within the district may, upon due notice of the opposite party, be summoned to
appear before the commissioners appointed to take testimony, or before a master or
examiner appointed in any cause . . . .”) (amended 1912))).
53
See supra note 24.
54
See HOPKINS, supra note 52, at 56 (citing FED. R. EQ. 67 (1842) (“If the parties
shall so agree, the testimony may be taken upon oral interrogatories by the parties or their
agents, without filing any written interrogatories.”) (amended 1912)). The default mode
of gathering evidence – a court-appointed officer administering a party-propounded
written interrogatory to the witness – was still available. See id. (“After the cause is at
issue, commissions to take testimony may be taken out . . . ”).
51
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and their counsel, who had been forbidden from attending the pretrial
examination,55 began to ask questions at the examination.
Amalia Kessler has suggested that the oral examination may have
had its roots in early nineteenth-century New York equity practice.56 In
Remsen v. Remsen, 57 Chancellor Kent stated that masters had been
conducting oral examinations rather than administering written
interrogatories.58 Kent indicated that the practice developed because an
oral examination was more convenient and flexible than the use of
written interrogatories.59 He described the inconveniences and rigidity of
the written interrogatory: “[In] long and complicated accounts . . . it
seems almost impossible to reduce the requisite inquiries to writing, in
the first instance, and to know what questions to put, except as they arise
in the progress of the inquiry.”60 Several state courts cited Remsen for
the proposition that masters were authorized to conduct oral
examinations.61
Kent also relaxed the restriction on the presence of parties at the
examination. Parties and their counsel were permitted to attend oral
examinations, although the court reserved the right to exclude them.62
Kessler speculates that Kent allowed the presence of the parties in order
to “maintain the role that litigants (or their counsel) traditionally had in
framing written interrogatories.”63 One treatise writer described Remsen
as establishing a process in which the master and the litigants
collaborated.64
Two kinds of officers could, under the 1842 Federal Equity Rules,
be in charge of depositions: masters and commissioners. Rule 77
provided that a master “shall have full authority . . . to examine on oath,
55

See MILLAR, supra note 49, at 270.
See Kessler, supra note 9, at 1225–26.
57
2 Johns. Ch. 495 (N.Y. Ch. 1817).
58
Id. at 497–98. In Remsen, Kent wrote that even though “the exhibition of
interrogatories, duly settled, be the usual mode of examination, appearing in the books, I
do not apprehend that it is indispensable.” Id. at 499. “The practice with us,” Kent
continued, “has been more relaxed, and oral examinations have frequently, if not
generally, prevailed.” Id.
59
See id. (noting that the practice of masters conducting oral examinations was “a
question merely of convenience”).
60
Id. at 500.
61
Kessler, supra note 9, at 1226 n. 245.
62
Remsen, supra note 57, at 502. (“The testimony may be taken in the presence of
the parties, or their counsel” unless “a special order of the Court” required that “it is to be
taken secretly.”)
63
Kessler, supra note 9, at 1229.
64
See HENDERSON, supra note 44, at 250 (stating that the parties and the master
together determine which method of examination would be “most expedient”).
56

2013]

The Origins of the Oral Deposition in the Federal Rules

57

viva voce, all witnesses produced by the parties before him.”65 Although
this rule authorized the master to conduct the examination, courts
interpreted the rule to permit parties to conduct the questioning. 66 A
commissioner was the American analogue to the English lay examiner
because the commissioner administered written interrogatories and
summarized testimony. Under Rule 67, a party could conduct the
examination in lieu of the commissioner. 67 The 1842 Federal Equity
Rules authorized parties to conduct oral examinations before either a
master or a commissioner.68
In 1861 the Supreme Court made it easier for a party to conduct an
oral examination. The 1842 version of Federal Equity Rule 67 had
required that both parties agree to an examination upon oral
interrogatories.69 The Court amended that rule to provide that only one
party had to request an oral examination in order to obtain it.70 The older
method of employing written interrogatories remained available to
litigants, but only if there was a “special reason” for using that method.71
By 1861, therefore, federal courts of equity permitted parties to conduct
oral examinations while a court-appointed examiner summarized the
testimony.72
The 1912 amendments to the Equity Rules established the rule that
oral testimony in open court would be the typical method for gathering
evidence.73 Rule 47 directed that depositions could be taken only “for
good and exceptional cause.”74 As Wayne Brazil has shown, although a
65

HOPKINS, supra note 52, at 58–59 (citing FED. R. EQ. 77 (1842) (amended 1912)).
See, e.g., Foote v. Silsby, 9 F. Cas. 391 (C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1856) (No. 4,920) (“Under
the 77th rule prescribed by the [S]upreme [C]ourt for the observance of the circuit courts
in equity cases, the plaintiff had a right, without special order, to call and examine the
defendants . . . ”), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, Silsby v. Foote, 61 U.S. 378 (1858).
67
See supra note 54.
68
Fed. R. Eq. 67, 77 (1842). The English Court of Chancery was similarly reformed
to permit obtaining evidence by oral examination. See Kessler, supra, note 9, at 1236.
69
Fed. R. Eq. 67 (1842) (“If the parties shall so agree . . . .”).
70
66 U.S. (1 Black) 6 (1861) (“Either party may give notice to the other that he
desires the evidence to be adduced in the cause to be taken orally, and thereupon all the
witnesses to be examined shall be examined before one of the examiners of the court, or
before an examiner to be specially appointed by the court . . . .”).
71
See id. at 7 (“Testimony may be taken on commission in the usual way, by written
interrogatories and cross-interrogatories, on motion to the court . . . for special reasons,
satisfactory to the court . . . .”).
72
Id. (“The depositions taken upon such oral examination shall be taken down in
writing by the examiner, in the form of narrative, unless he determines the examination
shall be by question and answer in special instances.”).
73
See RUSH, supra note 24 (citing FED. R. EQ. 46).
74
See RUSH, supra note 23 (citing FED. R. EQ. 47 (1912). Depositions continued to
be taken under this rule. See Reflectolyte Co. v. Edwin F. Guth Co., 31 F.2d 777, 778
66
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master was authorized to preside over the taking of a deposition under
Rule 47, the federal courts “confined use of special masters almost
exclusively to conventional references of complex matters at the trial
stage.”75 The basic structure of a deposition, in which parties (or their
counsel) ask questions while a court-appointed functionary records the
witness’s testimony, thus persisted past the final revision of the Federal
Equity Rules before the Federal Rules united the procedures at law and
equity.
The Federal Equity Rules pertained to obtaining proof by oral
examination (the preservation of potential testimony function), rather
than to obtaining discovery by oral examination (the investigation of
potential evidence function). Under the nineteenth-century rules, the
word “deposition” referred to the examiner’s report.76 When the drafters
of the 1938 Federal Rules united, in one examination procedure, the
preservation of potential testimony function and the investigation of
potential evidence function, 77 a precedent existed for a party-directed
oral examination in which an officer of the court recorded testimony.78
Although the Advisory Committee was not constrained by existing
practice – the Committee members could have created a radically
innovative procedure – two aspects of existing equity procedure
influenced the debate over whether the 1938 Rules should provide for a
master to rule upon the admissibility of evidence at depositions: 79 the
practice of permitting parties to conduct the examination, and the
presence of a court-appointed functionary without any powers and

(E.D. Mo. 1927); see also Wallace R. Lane, Working Under Federal Equity Rules, 29
HARV. L. REV. 55, 70-71 (1915).
75
Wayne D. Brazil, Referring Discovery Tasks to Special Masters: Is Rule 53 a
Source of Authority and Restrictions?, 8 AM. B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 143, 155 (1983).
Brazil also found that masters were not involved in the documentary discovery
procedures provided for in Rule 58. See supra text accompanying note 28. The rule
provided that the judge was supposed to settle disputes about interrogatories and
document requests, and Brazil found “only one reported case from the period between
1912 and 1938 that even mentions using a master in connection with a document
production.” Brazil, supra, at 159 (citing Pressed Steel Car Co., 240 F. at 137)
76
See 66 U.S. (1 Black) 6 (1861) (stating that after the examination is concluded “the
original depositions, authenticated by the signature of the examiner, shall be transmitted
by him to the clerk of the court . . . ”) (emphasis added).
77
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1938) (“testimony . . . may be taken . . . by deposition upon
oral examination . . . for the purpose of discovery or for use as evidence in the action or
for both purposes.”).
78
See, supra, Part III.B.
79
See Part V, infra.
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responsibilities other than swearing in witness and taking down
testimony.80
C. Persons Subject to Examination for Discovery
A party could seek discovery only from another party, because only
persons with an interest in the action could be examined. According to a
leading nineteenth-century English treatise, “[f]rom the earliest times it
has been a general rule . . . that no person without an interest could be
made a defendant to a bill for the purpose of discovery.” 81 George
Ragland, whose 1932 book Discovery Before Trial was the only
significant American treatise about pretrial discovery known at the time,
wrote that “[d]iscovery could be had only from parties under the
[American] chancery practice.”82 A non-party witness was therefore not
subject to oral examination for discovery. A non-party witness was,
however, subject to oral examination for the purposes of gathering
testimony, which was the manner in which the courts of equity gathered
evidence.
At common law a party to a suit was disqualified from testifying at
trial because the party had an interest in the litigation and might have
therefore been tempted to perjure himself.83 Obtaining discovery of an
80

For an argument that the Federal Rules represent the triumph of equitable
procedure over common law procedure, see Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered
Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U.
PA. L. REV. 909 (1987).
81
EDWARD BRAY, THE PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF DISCOVERY 40 (1885).
“Interest” meant “such an interest as that a decree could be made against him or as that he
might be affected by the decree.” Id. at 40–41.
82
GEORGE RAGLAND, JR., DISCOVERY BEFORE TRIAL 46 (1932). The Advisory
Committee relied on Ragland’s book during its deliberations regarding discovery rules.
See Part IV.D, infra.
83
For thorough coverage of the decline of the disqualification, see George Fisher,
The Jury’s Rise as Lie Detector, 107 YALE L.J. 575, 659–61 (1997) (describing the
downfall of witness competency rules in civil cases). Fisher has argued that the
disqualification of civil parties for interest dates to before the sixteenth century:
Exactly when the rules evolved is unclear. Wigmore traced the rule barring
civil parties to the sixteenth century and that barring all other interested
persons to the mid-seventeenth century. But it seems that these dates
merely mark the earliest references Wigmore could find; the rules may well
have been older. Barbara Shapiro notes that the rules bear a close, if
simplified, resemblance to the testimonial disqualifications that prevailed in
the Roman-canon law of the Continent.
Id. at 625 (citations omitted). Michael Macnair has suggested that Wigmore dates the
disqualification of parties too early and the disqualification of interested persons too late.
See MACNAIR, supra note 45, at 204–211. See also James Oldham, Truth-Telling in the
Eighteenth-Century English Courtroom, 12 L. & HIST. REV. 95, 107–17 (1994).
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adverse party in an action at law would, therefore, have been the only
opportunity for the party requesting discovery to learn what the
adversary knew. New York’s Field Code of 1848 provided for pretrial
oral examinations of adverse parties as a substitute for testimony at
trial. 84 Because the drafters of the Field Code presumed that the
pleadings would properly frame the issues in the case, the Code did not
include any provisions for interrogatories.85
D. Applicability of Rules of Evidence at an Examination
The rules of evidence govern the admissibility of testimony and
prevent the fact-finder from considering inadmissible testimony. At the
pretrial oral examination, the judge was absent, and neither a master nor
an examiner could rule on evidence.86 According to one treatise writer,
“the rules governing the admissibility or rejection of evidence before a
master or a referee are precisely the same as in a trial before the court.”87
If an adverse party objects to the “competency or admissibility” of
evidence “at the hearing before the master,” the master “should receive
the evidence, subject to the objection [by the adverse party], and the
court would be able then to pass upon the matter on review.”88 It was
well-established that examiners were incompetent to rule on the
admissibility of evidence. Under the 1912 amendments to Federal
Equity Rules 49 and 51, the examiner before whom a deposition was

84

1848 N.Y. Laws, c. 379 (71st Sess., April 12, 1848) [hereinafter “1848 Field
Code”] § 345. The examination would be taken “subject to the same rules of
examination, as any other witness.” Id. § 344.
85
Stephen N. Subrin, David Dudley Field and the Field Code: A Historical Analysis
of an Earlier Procedural Vision, 6 L. & HIST. REV. 311, 332 (1988).
86
Wisconsin and Missouri had provisions in their procedural codes that permitted,
under limited circumstance, the officer in charge of the deposition to rule on the
admissibility of evidence. See MO. REV. STAT. (1919) § 5446; WIS. STAT. (1927) c. 252,
§ 1415; RAGLAND, supra note 81, at 106 (Wisconsin), 107–08 (Missouri).
87
HENDERSON, supra note 44, at 296. “So, also, hearsay evidence is no more
admissible upon a hearing before the master than upon a trial in court.” Id. In De la Riva
v. Berreyessa, Chief Justice Murray of the Supreme Court of California held that
testimony that would be inadmissible at trial was also inadmissible at a pretrial
examination: “It appears . . . that testimony, though objected to, was admitted to establish
a demand for the price of wheat which was barred by the statute of limitations. The
record discloses much hearsay and irrelevant testimony, which should have been
excluded.” 2 Cal. 195, 197 (Cal. 1852).
88
HENDERSON, supra note 44, at 325 (quoting Kansas Loan & Trust Co. v. Electric
Ry., Light & Power Co. of Sedalia, MO, 108 F. 702 (C.C.W.D. Mo. 1901)). The court’s
reference to an “objection” by “the adverse party” is a reminder that by 1901 counsel was
present at oral examinations.
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taken had no authority to exclude evidence or to rule that a deponent
need not answer a question.89
IV. EXPANSION OF DISCOVERY UNDER THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE
A. The Enabling Act and The Advisory Committee
On June 19, 1934 Congress passed the Enabling Act, which
authorized the Supreme Court to establish new rules of procedure for the
district courts.90 The legislation empowered the Court “at any time [to]
unite the general rules prescribed by it for cases in equity with those
actions at law.”91 The Act also directed that the new rules “shall neither
abridge, enlarge, nor modify the substantive rights of any litigant.”92
On June 3, 1935, the Supreme Court appointed an Advisory
Committee “to prepare and submit to the Court a draft of a unified
system of rules . . . .” 93 Former U.S. Attorney General William D.
Mitchell was named to chair the Committee. 94 The Reporter to the
Advisory Committee was Charles Clark, the Dean of Yale Law School at
the time. 95 Edson Sunderland, a member of the Committee and a
professor at the University of Michigan Law School, was the primary
drafter of the discovery rules.96
89
ARMISTEAD M. DOBIE, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE 721
(1928).
90
“Be it enacted that the Supreme Court of the United States shall have the power to
prescribe, by general rules, for the district courts of the United States and for the courts of
the District of Columbia, the forms of process, writs, pleadings, and motions, and the
practice and procedure in civil actions at law.” ACT OF JUNE 19, 1934, c. 651, §1, 48 Stat.
1064, 28 U.S.C. § 723b (subsequently 28 U.S.C. § 2072).
91
Id. § 2. In 1922, Chief Justice Taft had recommended that the federal system
adopt a
procedure that merged law and equity. William Howard Taft, Possible and Needed
Reforms in the Administration of Justice in Federal Courts, 8 A.B.A. J. 601, 47 A.B.A.
REP. 250 (1922).
92
ACT OF JUNE 19, 1934, at § 2. For a discussion of how the new Federal Rules were
interpreted to erode the right to jury trial, see Subrin, supra note 79, at 929–31.
93
Order Appointing Committee to Draft Unified System of Equity and Law Rules,
295 U.S. 774 (1934).
94
Id.
95
Id.
96
Clark, supra note 13, at 10 (“Thus with the Chairman’s approval I was able to
commission Edson to prepare the draft of that part of the rules known originally as “V.
DEPOSITIONS, DISCOVERY AND SUMMARY JUDGMENTS.”“). Sunderland was a Sterling
Foundation Research Associate at Yale Law School from 1931 until 1933. Id. at 7.
The other members of the Committee included: former U.S. Attorney General George
Wickersham (who died in 1936 and was replaced by George Pepper); Scott Loftin, the
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B. A Note Regarding Sources
The official documentary records of the Advisory Committee’s
deliberations are located at the Federal Records Center in Suitland,
Maryland. 97 In 1938 Chief Justice Hughes placed that collection of
archival material under seal; the collection remained, as of 1983,
inaccessible to the general public, but the materials appear to have been
opened up by 1993.98 Although it is not clear why the Supreme Court
had the records sealed, the Advisory Committee was self-conscious of
the private nature of its deliberations.99
A second, substantial set of Committee records exists at Sterling
Memorial Library, Yale University. 100 Charles Clark, the reporter to the

President of the American Bar Association; Wilbur Cherry, Professor of Law at the
University of Minnesota; Armistead M. Dobie, Dean of the University of Virginia Law
School; Robert Dodge, a Boston lawyer; George Donworth, a former federal judge in
Seattle; Joseph Gamble, a Des Moines lawyer; Monte Lemann, a New Orleans lawyer
who taught at the Tulane University Law School; Edmund Morgan, Professor of Law at
Harvard Law School; Warren Olney, Jr., a San Francisco lawyer and founding member of
the Sierra Club; and Edgar Tolman, a Chicago lawyer and editor-in-chief of the American
Bar Association Journal.
97
See The Washington National Records Center at Suitland Maryland, NATIONAL
ARCHIVES, http://www.archives.gov/dc-metro/suitland/ (last visited Oct. 5, 2013).
98
See Brazil, supra note 75, at 160 n.113 (indicating that as of 1983 the collection
remained inaccessible to the general public and that “to date [1983], no scholar has been
permitted to quote any portion of these records”). Peter Charles Hoffer reported in 1993
that he was able to obtain a duplication of the full transcription of the Committee’s
deliberations from 1935 to 1937, which Edgar Tolman, the secretary of the Committee,
had deposited with the Supreme Court and which were archived at Suitland. Peter
Charles Hoffer, Text, Translation, Context, Conversation, Preliminary Notes for
Decoding the Deliberations of the Advisory Committee that Wrote the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, 37 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 409, 413-414 n.22 (1993). Hoffer was also able
to obtain copies of “all the drafts of the rules prepared by Clark and his staff, and the
comments of members of the bench and bar in the various judicial circuits to those
drafts . . . .” Id.
99
Subrin, supra note 10, at 718 n. 159 (quoting Summary of Proceedings of the First
Meeting of the Advisory Committee on Rules, Held in the Federal Building at Chicago,
June 20, 1935, in Records of the U.S. Judicial Conference: Committees on Rules of
Practice and Procedures, 1935-1988, at CI-103-42-46 (Congressional Information
Service) (“It was thereupon unanimously resolved, that as the committee is acting in an
advisory capacity only, no publicity be given to any action or decision taken by it, except
to the extent authorized by the Supreme Court.”)). At least one court has made use of
documents in the Clark Papers to inform its interpretation of the Federal Rules. See
Whalen v. Ford Motor Credit Corp., 684 F.2d 272 (4th Cir. 1982) (en banc).
100
The documents are housed in the Manuscripts and Archives Division of Sterling
Memorial Library (Manuscript Group Number 1344). An archivist-prepared finding aid
to the records, which consist of 38 boxes, was completed in March 1982 and may be
found at: http://drs.library.yale.edu:8083/HLTransformer/HLTransServlet?stylename=yul
.ead2002.xhtml.xsl&pid=mssa:ms.1344&query=charles%20e.%20clark&clear-stylesheet
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Advisory Committee while he was the dean of Yale Law School,
preserved 38 boxes of material. 101 The Clark Papers include reports,
memoranda, abstracts, transcripts and minutes of the Advisory
Committee’s meetings, preliminary drafts of the rules, and
correspondence that the Committee received from lawyers and judges,
including suggestions regarding proposed rules.102 The archive contains
verbatim transcripts of the Committee’s proceedings that occurred
between November 1935 and February 1937 103 and correspondence
dating from the period September 1934 to September 1939.104
The Clark Papers contain the two published preliminary drafts of
the proposed rules that the Advisory Committee circulated in order to
elicit comments and suggestions from lawyers and judges: a May 1936
“Preliminary Draft” 105 and an April, 1937 draft titled “Proposed
Rules.” 106 The Proposed Rules reflected changes that the Committee
made after reviewing the suggestions from the legal profession.107
Before publishing the “Preliminary Draft,” the Committee debated
several unpublished earlier drafts. I discuss these versions, which are
included in the Clark Papers, in this article. The draft rules pertaining to
the powers of the officer in charge of the deposition are collected at
Appendix A, below.

-cache=yes&hlon=yes&big=&adv=&filter=&hitPageStart=1&sortFields=&view=c01_4#
ref501 (last visited, Feb. 5, 2012).
101
Hereinafter CLARK PAPERS. The archivists at Yale have divided the 38 boxes into
three chronological sections: 1935–1939; 1943–1950; 1952–1956. I have only consulted
the first section, boxes 94 to 113.
102
In addition to the official documents at the Federal Records Center and the Clark
Papers, less complete collections of records from the Committee’s work exist. See
Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015, 1132–33
n.529 (1982) (describing sets of documents at Chicago, Michigan, Virginia, and other
locations).
103
CLARK PAPERS, supra note 100, boxes 94–96.
104
Id. at boxes 106–13. “Preparatory papers,” including preliminary drafts of the
rules, make up the bulk of the remainder of the portion of the archive relevant to the
period 1935–1938. Id. at boxes 97–105.
105
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES FOR CIVIL PROCEDURE, PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (May 1936) [hereinafter PRELIMINARY
DRAFT].
106
REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES FOR CIVIL PROCEDURE, PROPOSED
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES (April
1937) [hereinafter PROPOSED RULES].
107
See FINAL REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES FOR CIVIL PROCEDURE
(Nov. 1937) (reflecting primarily stylistic changes to its April 1937 PROPOSED RULES,
supra note ).
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C. Expansion of Availability of and Scope of Oral Examination for
Discovery
1. Edson Sunderland: A Proponent of Liberal Discovery
Edson Sunderland, the principal framer of the Federal Rules
pertaining to discovery,108 was a strong proponent of expansive discovery
as a means to eliminate surprise at trial. He wrote in 1933 that “effective
preliminary discovery” would increase the efficiency of trial.109 Under a
liberal discovery system in which all parties were aware of the facts, it
would be possible to dispense with “that elaborate maneuvering for
advantage, that vigilant and tireless eagerness to insist on every
objection, which not only prolongs and complicates the trial but makes
the outcome turn more upon the skill of counsel than upon the merits of
the case.”110
Sunderland also advocated more liberal discovery than was
available before the Federal Rules because he believed that pleadings
were an inadequate method of framing issues for trial.111 The function of
pleadings consisted of framing the issues in the case and disclosure of the
parties’ view of the evidence. The pleadings thus could be an
opportunity for a party to conceal information.112 The virtues of liberal
discovery included the disclosure of actual evidence and the ability of the
parties to directly assess its merits. More thorough investigation of the
evidence would promote settlement and reduce the need for trial.
Sunderland had been impressed by the efficiency of the English
“summons for direction,” a type of pretrial conference with a standing
master.113
108

On the twentieth anniversary of the Federal Rules, Clark wrote: the “original
conception [of Rule 16], as well as the several rules for discovery and summary
judgment, was and now remains a tribute to Edson’s genius.” Clark, supra note 13, at 10.
109
See Edson R. Sunderland, Improving the Administration of Civil Justice, 167
ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE 60, 74 (1933)
(“[A] trial which follows an effective preliminary discovery gains much in efficiency.”).
110
Id. at 74. “With the facts on each side understood by both parties when the trial
opens, leading questions lose their objectionable character, the witnesses can be brought
at once to the main points in controversy with no waste of time over formal matters, the
necessity for cross-examination is greatly reduced, and the actual introduction of proof
may often be dispensed with altogether.” Id. at 74–75 (emphasis added).
111
See Edson R. Sunderland, Scope and Method of Discovery Before Trial:
Inadequacy of the Pleadings as a Basis for Trial, 42 YALE L.J. 863 (1933).
112
The Federal Rules debased pleading. See FED. R. CIV. P. 8 (1938) (amended
2010).
113
Edson R. Sunderland, An Appraisal of English Procedure, 9 J. AM. JUD. SOC. 164,
167 (1925). According to Sunderland:

2013]

The Origins of the Oral Deposition in the Federal Rules

65

Sunderland believed that reforming the pretrial phase of litigation
in such a way that the procedures governing discovery before trial
mimicked those in use at trial itself would result in the improved
administration of justice. In 1933 he endorsed establishing such a
pretrial discovery procedure. 114 During the Advisory Committee’s
deliberations, Sunderland consistently supported broad, rather than
restricted, rights to discovery.115 Writing in 1932, Sunderland alluded to
the “widespread fear of liberalizing discovery,” stating that “hostility to
‘fishing expeditions’ before trial is a traditional and powerful taboo” and
that only “experience” would effectively neutralize such hostility. 116
Clark shared Sunderland’s enthusiasm for broad rights to discovery.
The Advisory Committee held its first meeting on June 20, 1935 and as
early as June 28 Clark indicated his preference for liberal discovery
provisions. When he prepared his “tentative” outline of the subjects to
be dealt with by the new rules, Clark included a section on “Discovery
and Summary Proceedings.” With respect to the topics “Discovery,
Summary Judgment, and Defendant’s Motion for Judgment Supported
by Affidavits,” Clark wrote a note on the outline that said: “Liberal
provisions should be drafted on all these matters. Cf. RAGLAND,
DISCOVERY (1931).”117

Id.

There is nothing in the English court system which proceeds under such
speed and pressure as a hearing before a master on a summons for
directions. The solicitors are not allowed the luxury of a seat, but stand at a
sort of high desk before the master, and are hardly given time to gather up
their papers before the next group of solicitors has crowded forward to take
their place. Each of the masters has a docket of sixteen or eighteen cases per
hour, and he usually finishes the list on time. The summons for directions,
by which the vast scheme of discovery is largely administered, is thus a
tremendously efficient instrument.

114
Sunderland, supra note 110, at 877 (“[I]t is also possible to preserve that
correlation [between scope and method of discovery] by changing both, authorizing a
discovery as broad in its scope as the trial itself, and providing the same method of
examination which is employed in trial practice. This is the solution which has been
found for the problem in a group of jurisdictions of which Wisconsin is the most
conspicuous example. Discovery has by this means become a widely used system of pretrial procedure which has profoundly affected the administration of justice.”).
115
See, e.g., Transcript of Advisory Committee Meeting at 740 (Feb. 22, 1936), in
CLARK PAPERS, supra note 100, box 95 (Sunderland objecting to Pepper and Mitchell’s
tentative suggestion that the judge should be able to “define the things you can fish
about”).
116
Edson R. Sunderland, Foreword, in RAGLAND, supra note 81, at iii.
117
Supreme Court of the United States Advisory Committee on Rules of Civil
Procedure Topical Outline of Proposed Rules (June 28, 1935) 1, 5 in CLARK PAPERS,
supra note 100, at Box 108. It is not clear to whom Clark was addressing his note – it
may have been a note to himself.
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2. The Liberal Discovery Policy of the Federal Rules118
The Federal Rules authorized the use of “virtually every known
discovery method.”119 The Advisory Committee redefined the function
of the oral deposition, by uniting both the preservation of potential
testimony function and the investigation of potential evidence function
into a single examination procedure.120
The Federal Rules expanded, with respect to the oral deposition,
both the scope of what information was discoverable121 and the range of
persons subject to discovery (both parties and non-party witnesses).122
Because the oral deposition under the Federal Rules combined the
investigatory examination for discovery with the examination to gather
and preserve testimony, the federal statute that restricted the
circumstance under which a party could take a deposition de bene esse
was repealed.123 In addition, the previous “privilege against disclosure of
one’s case” – the rule that a party could only obtain discovery of matters
related to the discoveror’s case – no longer applied under the Federal
Rules.124 At the Advisory Committee’s meeting on February 22, 1936,
118

I focus in this section on the oral deposition.
Subrin, supra note 10, at 300. These methods included “interrogatories, oral
depositions, written depositions, document requests, physical and mental examinations,
inspection of property, and requests for admissions.” Id. Another commentator has
likened the range of discovery devices available to an arsenal of weapons: “A veritable
arsenal of weapons for discovery is provided [by the 1938 Rules], from which a skilled
lawyer may select those best suited for his purpose, just as an experienced golfer chooses
the club which best fits his immediate needs.” Alexander Holtzoff, Instruments of
Discovery under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 41 MICH. L. REV. 205, 205 (1942).
120
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a) (1938) (amended 2010) (“[T]he testimony of any
person . . . may be taken at the instance of any party by deposition upon oral
examination . . . for the purpose of discovery or for use as evidence in the action or for
both purposes.”).
121
See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b) (1938) (amended 2010) (“[T]he deponent may be
examined regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter
involved in the pending action, whether relating to the claim or defense of the examining
party or to the claim or defense of any other party, including the existence, description,
nature, custody, condition, and location of any books, documents, or other tangible things
and the identity and location of persons having knowledge of relevant facts.”).
122
See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a) (1938) (amended 2010) (“[T]he testimony of any person,
whether a party or not, may be taken . . . ”) (emphasis added).
123
The Enabling Act had stated: “[the rules] shall take effect six months after their
promulgation, and thereafter all laws in conflict therewith shall be of no further force or
effect. “ ACT OF JUNE 19, 1934, c. 651, §1, 48 Stat. 1064, 28 U.S.C. § 723b (subsequently
28 U.S.C. § 2072).
124
James A. Pike, The New Federal Deposition-Discovery Procedure and the Rules of
Evidence, 34 ILL. L. REV. 1, 5 (1939). Ragland had described that, in New York, the
restriction the defendant’s discovery to matters related to his affirmative defenses led to
the practice of putting “in fictitious defenses for the sole purpose of securing an
119
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Mitchell explained the difference between the preservation of potential
testimony function and the investigation of potential evidence function,
concluding that “there ought not to be any limit to taking a deposition to
discover, no matter where the witness is.”125
The Advisory Committee expanded discovery in two other ways.
First, the drafters decided, consistent with equity practice,126 to adopt the
rule that testimony to which a party objected would be recorded
notwithstanding the objection.127 This rule permitted a party to inquire
into facts that might be inadmissible evidence. Although the law of
evidence still nominally applied at the oral deposition,128 the officer in
charge of the deposition had no power to rule on the admissibility of
evidence. Second, the drafters employed a broad standard of relevance
regarding the matters into which a party was permitted to inquire.129 As
a contemporary observer pointed out, “relevancy immediately
presupposes a referent.”130 Because such a referent may be obscure at
the pretrial phase of the litigation, any matter that may be relevant would
fall within the ambit of Rule 26(b). In 1946, this rule was amended to
expand the standard of relevance: “[R]elevant information need not be

examination of his adversary,” a practice of which New York lawyers were critical.
RAGLAND, supra note 81, at 132.
125
Advisory Committee Meeting Transcript (Feb. 1936), supra note 114, at 660–61.
126
See supra Part III.E..
127
Fed R. Civ. P. 30(c) (1938) (amended 2007) (“All objections made at the time of
the examination . . . shall be noted by the officer upon the deposition. Evidence objected
to shall be taken subject to the objections.”). Accord Kansas Loan & Trust Co., 108 F.
702) (directing that evidence at a hearing before a master be recorded despite an
objection).
128
Technically, the “assimilation of discovery into the deposition mold . . . [brought]
about the application of one law of evidence for both viva voce and pre-trial testimony.”
Pike, supra note 123, at 7.
129
Fed R. Civ. P. 26(b), supra note 120 (subject to provisions intended to protect
parties from abusive discovery, “the deponent may be examined regarding any matter not
privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action . . . .”).
See also Leverett v. Cont’l Briar Pipe Co., Inc., 25 F. Supp 80, 81–82 (E.D.N.Y. 1938)
(interpreting Rule 26 to permit the “broadest type of examination” in “the field of
depositions and discovery”). The Committee had rejected two possible methods of
limiting the scope of inquiry at the deposition: in 1935 Clark had initially proposed more
rigorous pleading rules and tying the scope of discovery more closely to the allegations in
the pleadings; also, Sunderland’s initial draft (also in 1935) of the oral deposition rule
would have constrained discovery to “any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the
pending cause as shown in the pleadings filed therein.” See Subrin, supra 10, at 722-23.
130
Pike, supra note 123, at 3. In federal equity practice the scope of what constituted
relevant testimony was limited by the order of reference to the master. See HENDERSON,
supra note 44, at 325 (“[T]he master cannot hear evidence bearing on questions already
settled in the order of reference relevance.”) (citing Remsen, 2 Johns. Ch. At 495.)

68

SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW

[Vol. 10:43

admissible at the trial if the discovery appears reasonably calculated to
lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.”131
Sunderland and the Committee combined discovery devices and
discovery policies that had been adopted by various jurisdictions.132 No
single state procedural system in existence at the time of the drafting of
the Federal Rules included all of the discovery provisions that the Rules
would contain. During the Advisory Committee’s campaign to gain
public support for the preliminary draft of the Rules, Mitchell asserted
that “[discovery] rules as liberal as those we have proposed have been in
use in the English courts for many years” and that “similar systems are in
effect in some States of the Union.” 133 In fact, the Federal Rules’
discovery provisions went farther than any other jurisdiction at the time,
as Clark later admitted in 1959.134
D. The Advisory Committee’s Sources
Sunderland and other members of the Committee relied on
Discovery Before Trial, 135 the book by Sunderland’s student, George
Ragland, Jr.136 In his book, Ragland provided a survey of discovery rules
131

FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (1946) (amended 2010)
Alexander Holtzoff, Origin and Sources of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
30 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1057, 1072 (1955). At the meeting of the Advisory Committee on
April 17, 1935, Sunderland said of his first draft of the discovery procedure for the
Federal Rules: “I think it is an advance over what any one of those states have. But I
think it is not an advance over what can be found in these states taken together.” Id.
With regard to source material, Holtzoff stated that he was “indebted to Mr. Leland L.
Tolman, the Secretary of the Advisory Committee [of 1954] on the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, for access to the stenographic minutes of the meetings of the Committee.” Id.
at 1057. Because Holtzoff quoted liberally from the minutes of meetings held by the
original Advisory Committee, Leland Tolman must have had access to records of the
1930s Committee.
133
William D. Mitchell, Attitude of Advisory Committee—Events Leading to Proposal
for Uniform Rules—Problems on which Discussion is Invited [Address at the Open
Session for Discussion of the Proposed Rules of Civil Procedure for the Federal Courts],
22 A.B.A. J. 780, 782 (1936).
134
Clark, supra note 13, at 11. (“The system thus envisaged by Sunderland had no
counterpart at the time he proposed it. It goes very much beyond English procedure,
which does not provide for general depositions of parties or witnesses. And only
sporadically was there to be found here and there a suggestion for some part of the
proposed system, but nowhere the fusion of the whole to make a complete system such as
we ultimately presented.”).
135
See RAGLAND, supra note 81.
136
See, e.g., Preparatory Papers: Drafts, Reports and Correspondence used in the
Preparation of the Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Courts of the United States,
in CLARK PAPERS, supra note 100, box 98 (citing Ragland’s book in a Note to Rule 30(c)
(Officers Before Whom Depositions May be Taken) [see Appendix A, infra]). See also
text accompanying note 116, supra. Sunderland wrote the foreword to Ragland’s book
132
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and practices in all (at the time) forty-eight states, in the federal courts, in
England, and in Ontario and Quebec. 137 In addition to gathering
procedural rules and statutory and case law, Ragland undertook “field
studies” in several North American cities to explore the experience “with
each type of [discovery] device which is being used.”138 Ragland was an
enthusiastic supporter of expanded discovery, quoting with approval a
lawyer who had told him: “The lawyer who does not use discovery
procedure is in the position of a physician who treats a serious case
without first using the X-ray.”139
1. Persons Subject to Examination for Discovery
Consistent with the traditional rule at equity, 140 in all of the
jurisdictions that Ragland studied, “adverse” parties were subject to
examination for discovery. 141 Ragland reported that in Indiana,
Kentucky, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, Ohio and Texas, a party
was permitted to take a deposition upon oral interrogatories of non-party
witnesses, but the procedure he described was intended to preserve
witness testimony, rather than to investigate potential evidence. 142
Unlike the federal de bene esse statute, however, in those seven states a
witness could be deposed regardless of whether he would be unavailable
at trial. The discovery rules in Wisconsin did not permit examination of

and Clark had published a positive review of it in 1933. Charles E. Clark, Book Reviews,
42 YALE L.J. 988 (1933) (reviewing GEORGE RAGLAND, JR., DISCOVERY BEFORE TRIAL
(1932)).
137
See RAGLAND, supra note 81, at 267–391 (1932) (statutory provisions on discovery
in these jurisdictions).
138
Id. at v. Ragland undertook his field studies in cities in Indiana, Kansas,
Kentucky, Massachusetts, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York,
Ohio, Ontario, Quebec, Texas and Wisconsin. Ragland’s studies included interviews
with judges, lawyers, and – where available – officials in charge of discovery
examinations. Id.
139
RAGLAND, supra note 81, at 251. Subrin has related Ragland’s procedural
philosophy, which also included eliminating the “sporting theory of justice,” to the
themes of Roscoe Pound’s 1906 speech The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the
Administration of Justice. Subrin, supra note 10, at 709-10.
140
See supra text accompanying note 80.
141
RAGLAND, supra note 81, at 37. Thus, for example, a Wisconsin court found that a
co-defendant could have been examined only if his interests are actually adverse. O’Day
v. Meyers, 147 Wis. 549 (1911). In New Jersey and Louisiana, only the parties of record
were subject to discovery. See Apperson v. Mut. Ben. Life Ins. Co., 38 N.J.L. 272 (Sup.
Ct. 1876); LA. REV. CODE OF PRAC. § 347 (1927).
142
RAGLAND, supra note 81, at 50.
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witnesses even though that state’s rules permitted liberal examination of
parties and representatives of corporate parties.143
2. Powers of the Presiding Officer at an Examination
Ragland had reported that under the practices of Missouri,
Nebraska, New Hampshire, Ohio, and Wisconsin, the officer in charge of
the examination had the power to compel answers, decide objections, and
rule on the admissibility of testimony.144 In Nebraska, New Hampshire,
and Ohio, a notary presided over the examination and could hold an
examinant in contempt for refusing to answer a question. 145 Ragland
indicated that it was very rare for a notary actually to punish an
examinant and that the mere threat of contempt often compelled the
examinant to answer the question. Ragland suspected that a notary was
reluctant to exercise his power to hold someone in contempt because the
notary had no basis to know whether the particular question was proper,
and may have been afraid of liability for wrongful committal.146
In Wisconsin, a “court commissioner” – akin to a standing master –
was in charge of an examination for discovery. 147 In his field study,
Ragland encountered three different understandings of how the
commissioner was expected to respond to objections at an oral
examination.148 Milwaukee lawyers believed that a commissioner had
the same powers as a judge in chambers; the commissioner had the
authority to rule on objections and punish for contempt. 149 Madison
lawyers believed that the commissioners only possessed the power to
decide challenges to the relevance of a question. Ragland reported that
143

Id. at 47. The Ontario history is intriguing: although the courts were empowered
to grant discovery of witnesses “when it appears necessary for the purposes of justice,” in
1894 the Supreme Court of Ontario overruled itself and reinstated the prohibition on
discovery of witnesses.
144
Id. at 104-13.
145
Cf. Olmsted v. Edson, 98 N.W. 415, 417 (Neb. 1904) (stating that, like a judicial
officer, a notary “is not liable for a mere error of judgment while acting within his
jurisdiction but he is not protected if he assumes to act beyond the scope of his
authority.”). The sanction for contempt included imprisonment. Id. at 416.
146
Id. at 104-13.
147
The court commissioner was an officer of the court appointed by the circuit judge.
The commissioner held his office during the term of office of the appointing judge. See
WIS. STAT. § 1415 c. 252 (1927),.
148
RAGLAND, supra note 81, at 104–06.
149
In practice, the oral examinations for discovery in Milwaukee were supervised by
reporters, whose primary task was to record testimony. The reporters thus resembled the
lay examiner appointed by the Court of Chancery in England or the examiner under the
Federal Equity Rules. In Milwaukee the parties would call in the commissioner when a
dispute arose regarding the propriety of the questioning. Id. at 106.
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in Madison commissioners had ruled that they had no power to decide
objections regarding competency, privilege, or hearsay. In other parts of
Wisconsin the perception among lawyers was that the court
commissioner was not authorized to rule on objections and that the
commissioner only noted objections in the record.150
In Missouri, the party served with a notice of deposition was
allowed, under certain circumstances, to apply to the court for the
appointment of a “special commissioner” to supervise the
examination.151 The option of applying to the court for the appointment
of a special commissioner was only available in cities with a population
of fifty thousand or more.152 The special commissioner had “power and
authority to hear and determine all objections to testimony and evidence,
and to admit and exclude the same, in the same manner and to the same
extent as the circuit court might in a trial of said cause before said circuit
court.” 153 The special commissioner was “learned in law” and would
“preside as an officer of the court at the taking of depositions,” ensuring
“that the inquiry might be confined to the legitimate issues of the case
and not range over other and impertinent fields.” 154 The option of
requesting a special commissioner was thus a method of protecting an
examinant from abusive discovery practices: a presiding officer applied
the rules of evidence contemporaneously with the taking of deposition
testimony.
Ragland found that in several other jurisdictions,155 the officer in
charge of the examination only played a ministerial role, such as
swearing in the examinant and recording testimony.156 To the extent that
150

Ragland proposed several explanations for the diversity of opinion in Wisconsin
regarding the power of the court commissioners. One explanation was that the courts in
Milwaukee were too busy to decide objections arising out of discovery and that therefore
the judges there encouraged the commissioners to issue rulings. In Madison, Ragland
indicated, the courts were able to entertain certifications of commissioners’ decision. Id.
151
MO. REV. STAT. § 5446 (1919).
152
Id.
153
Id.
154
State ex rel. Wilson v. Burney, 193 Mo. App. 326, 334 (1916).
155
California, Indiana, Kentucky, New Jersey, North Carolina, Ontario, Quebec, and
Texas. RAGLAND, supra note 81, at 97.
156
Ragland described the officer’s powers thus:
[T]he officer in charge is a reporter with power only to swear the witness
and preserve orderly conduct of the hearing; he has no power to compel
answers or to decide objections to questions; if objections arise which
cannot be decided among counsel, the examination is adjourned until a
ruling can be obtained from the trial court.
Id. In every jurisdiction that Ragland studied, the officer in charge of the examination
was responsible for swearing in the examinant. Id. at 81.
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this type of officer functioned as a stenographer without the power to
adjudicate discovery disputes, he played the same role as the examiner in
both English and federal equity practice. In contrast, the master-like
court commissioner in Wisconsin and the special commissioner in
Missouri exercised authority of a quasi-judicial nature.
In jurisdictions in which the officer in charge had no power to rule
on objections, the officer would note an objection of counsel in the
record. Ragland recounted that, in case of an objection to a question, the
lawyer who asked the question and the lawyer who objected to it would
argue about the basis for the objection while the officer supervising the
deposition played no role in the discussion.157 Typically the two lawyers
would reach an agreement, but the proponent of the question could
adjourn the deposition proceedings and bring a motion before the court
to compel an answer: “[u]sually they [the lawyers] reach an agreement:
the proponent either agrees to withdraw or restate the question or the
opponent agrees to allow an answer subject to objection.”158
Ragland favored “an assimilation of discovery procedure and
deposition procedure . . . .” 159 He praised systems in which anyone
authorized by statute to preside over depositions generally was also
permitted to preside over depositions for discovery. Ragland had
recognized the efficiency of adapting a pre-existing functionary – the
person in charge of the procedure to preserve testimony – to play the
same role in a proceeding that combined the preservation of potential
testimony function with the investigation of potential evidence function.
The fact that the federal courts did not employ personnel similar to the
commissioners in Wisconsin and Missouri was one of the reasons why
the Advisory Committee ultimately rejected a rule expressly modeled on
the Missouri rule.160

157

The practice in Ontario differed. In Toronto, the person in charge of the deposition
(the “examiner” even though counsel actually questioned the witness) “[would] enter[]
into the discussion with the lawyers as to the propriety of the question and aids a
decision.” Id. at 100. The examiner in Toronto “exercise[d] limited powers” including
the power to order a witness to answer and the power to relieve the witness from
answering. If an examinant refused to answer a question, the examiner could not compel
an answer, but the court could compel an answer upon a motion by the proponent of the
question. Id.
158
Id. at 99.
159
RAGLAND, supra note 81, at 97.
160
See Draft Rule 32(b) and Note, in PRELIMINARY DRAFT, supra note 104, at 60–61
(alluding to the Missouri rule providing for a special commissioner). For the text of the
rule and notes, see Appendix A.

2013]

The Origins of the Oral Deposition in the Federal Rules

73

V. SAFEGUARDS AGAINST ABUSES OF THE RIGHT TO ORAL
EXAMINATION FOR DISCOVERY: THE PROPOSED MASTER-SUPERVISED
DEPOSITION
A. The Committee’s Anticipation of Demand for Protection Against
Overreaching Discovery
In 1936 the Advisory Committee affirmed that the depositiondiscovery provisions of the Federal Rules permitted an “unlimited right
of discovery.” 161 Despite Sunderland and Clark’s strong support for
expanding discovery, some of the members of the Advisory Committee
anticipated a backlash against a liberal right to discovery unless the
Committee provided better safeguards. At the Committee’s meeting on
February 22, 1936, Mitchell, the chairman of the Committee, stated:
“[W]e are going to have an outburst against this discovery business
unless we can hedge it about with some appearance of safety against
fishing expeditions.”162 At the same meeting, Robert Dodge, the Boston
lawyer, also expressed an awareness of widespread opposition to
liberalizing discovery, suggesting that the Committee “cloak” the
discovery provisions in such a way as to make them more acceptable to
the public.163 Dodge paraphrased a conversation he had had with two
district court judges who were anxious about an unrestricted discovery
system. The judges, according to Dodge, had told him: “[we] hope, for
heaven’s sake, you are not going to open up this discovery before
trial.”164

161

Note to Draft Rule 32(b) (1936), in PRELIMINARY DRAFT, supra note 104, at 61.
Proceedings of Feb. 22, 1936 at 735, CLARK PAPERS, supra note 100, box 95.
When Mitchell presented the new proposed Rules to the A.B.A., he emphasized, perhaps
disingenuously, the Committee’s avowed interest in protecting against discovery abuses:
Rules on this subject [discovery] should be carefully drawn to guard against
abuse. On the other hand, they should be sufficiently liberal to accomplish
the intended purpose. We ask particularly for careful consideration of the
proposed rules on this subject. Will the Committee’s proposals sufficiently
guard against abuse? Should the right of examination before trial be limited
to the parties, or extended to other witnesses? Any suggestions you may
make based on practical experience will be gratefully received.
Mitchell, supra note 132, at 782.
163
Dodge remarked: “[I]t must be understood that we have to cloak [the prospective
discovery practice] in such a way as to make it popular in those parts of the country
where they are totally unfamiliar with it.” Proceedings of Feb. 22, 1936 at 731, CLARK
PAPERS, supra note 100, box 95.
164
Id. at 730–31. Olney, too, urged that “it should be apparent on the face of the rules
that there are safeguards, so that they [the rules] will appeal to the members of the
profession who are not acquainted with this [discovery] practice.” Id. at 755.
162
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The Committee members expressed concerns about the effect of
expanded discovery on public support for the Rules, and about the
potential abuse of discovery devices.165
B. Proposal for a Master-Supervised Deposition
1. The Committee’s Deliberations
Concerned that discovery tools would be abused by lawyers,
George Wickersham, the vice-chairman of the Advisory Committee until
his death in 1936, announced in November 1935 that he would propose
that the Rules require that depositions be taken “in the presence of some
judge or officer having the power to rule on evidence.”166 Mitchell also
supported such a proposal; he believed that “having a master on demand”
might “prevent objections from the bar as to fishing expeditions among
parties.”167
The first preliminary draft of the Rules, proposed in October 1935,
did not contain a provision for the appointment of a master to supervise a
deposition.168 In November, the Committee directed Sunderland to draft
a rule that provided for the appointment of a master with the power to
rule on admissibility.169 Sunderland included the provision in what was
at the time draft Rule 30(c). 170 Under the text Sunderland drafted,
however, the option of having a master appointed would have been
available only if the party requesting the appointment could
“show . . . special and unusual circumstances sufficient to satisfy the
court that the deposition cannot be satisfactorily taken” before the default
officer who would take down testimony at the deposition.171 In his Note
to draft Rule 30(c)172 Sunderland indicated that he was not enthusiastic
about Wickersham’s proposal. Sunderland emphasized in his Note that,
aside from the Wisconsin and Missouri practices that Ragland had

165

See infra Part V.B.2.
Proceedings of Advisory Committee on Uniform Rules of Civil Procedure for the
District Court of the United States at 252 (Nov. 4, 1935), in CLARK PAPERS, supra note
100, box 94.
167
Proceedings of Feb. 22, 1936 at 727, CLARK PAPERS, supra note 100, box 95.
168
Preliminary Draft I (Oct. 15, 16, 25, 1935), CLARK PAPERS, supra note 100, box
97.
169
Proceedings of Feb. 22, 1936 at 750, CLARK PAPERS, supra note 100, box 95.
170
See Draft Rule 30(c) (Jan. 13, 1936), in TENTATIVE DRAFT II, infra, Appendix A.
171
Id.
172
See Note to Draft Rule 30(c), TENTATIVE DRAFT II, infra, Appendix A.
166
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documented,173 there was no precedent for appointing an officer with the
power to decide objections.
On February 22, 1936, the Committee deliberated about whether
the Rules should permit an examinant to request that a master with the
power to rule on the admissibility of evidence preside at the examination.
Sunderland, Mitchell, and the Harvard Law professor Edmund Morgan174
confirmed at the meeting that, absent the appointment of a master, the
Rules contemplated that the officer in charge of the deposition played the
same role as the “examiner” in federal equity practice. The officer’s
primary responsibility was to record testimony.175
In order to placate both those on the Committee who favored
unencumbered discovery and those members of the bar who might be
apprehensive of fishing expeditions, Mitchell proposed that Rule 30(c)
should only apply when the deponent was an adverse party.176 Monte
Lemann, the New Orleans lawyer on the Advisory Committee, objected
that this restriction would not allay fears of the potential for abusive
discovery.177 Mitchell then proposed, and Lemann agreed, to “leave it
discretionary with the court in other cases.”178

173

See supra Part IV.D.3.
See supra note 92,.
175
In response to a worry about the effect of an adversary paying for the officer’s
services, Sunderland stated: “as a matter of fact, very little harm will be done, anyway,
because these examiners have no power.” Mitchell responded: “Yes; but they have to
transcribe, certify, and return the deposition” and Morgan agreed: “They have the power
of reducing the thing to writing, and methodizing, so-called, the deposition.”
Proceedings of Feb. 22, 1936 at 726-27, CLARK PAPERS, supra note 100, box 95.
176
Mitchell’s comment again underscored his motivation for providing safeguards to
the discovery rules:
Might we say that it would be sufficient protection if we require a master to
rule on questions only in those cases where the witness to be examined is an
adverse party? I thought perhaps if he were just an ordinary witness he
could protect himself fully by refusing to testify and standing on his rights.
I think, probably, so long as we are putting this in just to quiet
apprehensions of lawyers, that it would be sufficient if it were limited to a
case where you started to examine an adverse party – and by “adverse
party” I mean directors, officers, and agents of a corporation or association,
and so forth –
Id. at 728 (emphasis added).
177
Id. (“If you are really worried about that, as Mr. Wickersham was, I think, very
much, I am not sure that your limitations would relieve that fear or allay it . . . [because]
you may get a fishing expedition by going around to a bank, or a third person, not my
employee, and asking a lot of questions that ought not to be asked.”) Like Mitchell,
Lemann distinguished anxieties about the public reception of the proposed discovery
practice from his own worries. See id. at 728–29 (“I am not subscribing particularly to
that fear [of fishing expeditions], but I am making the point that if the fear is entertained,
174
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Following the exchange between Mitchell and Lemann, Sunderland
and Morgan made the case against the proposal to allow for a master to
rule on the admissibility of evidence at the examination. Sunderland
opined that the proposal was unworkable179 and stressed that authorizing
an officer in charge of a deposition to rule on the admissibility of
testimony was both “contrary to the universal practice”180 and would be
regressive, restricting the scope of discovery.181 Mitchell was skeptical
that the novelty of a rule allowing for a master required the Committee to
reject the proposal.182
Sunderland’s claim regarding the lack of precedent for Rule 30(c)
was somewhat strained. Although he was correct that the Federal Equity
Rules required the officer in charge of an examination to report all
testimony notwithstanding objections, 183 those rules applied to
depositions on oral or written interrogatories for the purpose of
preserving potential testimony. If the officer in charge did not record
objectionable testimony, then the court would have no means of deciding
whether to suppress that testimony. The Advisory Committee was
combining both the preservation of potential testimony and the
investigation of potential evidence functions in the deposition procedure.
The Committee made the affirmative decision to allow rules that
governed the evidence-gathering function – the requirement of
preserving objectionable testimony – also to govern the discovery
function.

and you want to avoid it or protect against it, . . . [Rule 30(b) would not] leave it
sufficiently protected.”)
178
Id. at 728.
179
Id. at 729. (“As a matter of fact, I do not see how this thing will work anyway.”).
180
Proceedings of Feb. 22, 1936 at 729, CLARK PAPERS, supra note 100, box 95. (“I
do not find any authority for these examiners or masters ruling on testimony. The equity
rule expressly provides that all evidence taken before an examiner or like officer, together
with any objections, shall be saved and returned into court.”). Sunderland, however, did
know about the Wisconsin and Missouri practices that Ragland described in Discovery
Before Trial.
181
Id. at 729–30. In response to Morgan’s comment “I think it would be very
unfortunate to let a master rule on evidence,” Sunderland said: “if we put in a thing like
this, we would be going backward” and “[i]t would be a serious regression on our part.”
Id.
182
See Proceedings of Feb. 22, 1936 at 731, CLARK PAPERS, supra note 100, box 95
(Mitchell exclaiming to Morgan: “It may not have been the practice normally to give a
master the power to rule on evidence, unless he is going to make findings of fact, but
there is no reason on God’s earth why we cannot have a rule [that does give the master
the power to rule on evidence].”).
183
See supra Part III.E..
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In response to Sunderland’s and Morgan’s criticisms, Mitchell
began to reconsider his support for Wickersham’s initial proposal: “I am
inclined to think that my suggestion, which was made to quiet the fears
of General Wickersham and others, is probably not a sound one.” 184
Mitchell’s comment spurred more debate.185
Monte Lemann suggested that the Committee adopt the New York
rule, in which an objection to a question asked during an examination
could be referred immediately to the judge. 186 Sunderland rejected
Lemann’s suggestion on the grounds that “running to the judge” would
be “a great nuisance to the courts” and would “not work at all in sparsely
settled circuits.”187 Mitchell agreed, pointing out that the judges “might
be trying cases, and they would have to stop. They could not do that.”188
Sunderland also referred to the Wisconsin practice, in which it was said
that judges did not like being asked to rule on discovery disputes and
instead made the examinant “answer, so [the lawyers] do not go to [the
judges] much.”189
Sunderland sought to break the impasse by suggesting a cosmetic
rule: “Why can we not put in a provision for a master on application, just
to look well, but not put anything about giving the master power to
exclude evidence?” 190 Both Lemann and Mitchell thought that
Sunderland’s idea was unhelpful.
Lemann said that because
Sunderland’s “high-class man” to supervise the deposition191 would only
be able to “sit there and look pleasant,” “you might as well have a lowclass man.”192
George Wharton Pepper, a former Senator from Pennsylvania who
joined the Committee after Wickersham died in 1936,193 weighed in and

184

Proceedings of Feb. 22, 1936 at 730, CLARK PAPERS, supra note 100, box 95.
See id. at 730–62.
186
According to Lemann: “If the master says, ‘I think this testimony ought not to go
in,’ the fellow who wants it to go in would say, ‘Let us go right down to the judge now
and let him rule on it.’ I understand that is what they do in New York.” Id. at 733–34.
187
Id. at 734.
188
Id.
189
Id.; see also RAGLAND, supra note 81, at 104–06 (describing Wisconsin judges’
aversion to adjudicating disputes arising out of depositions).
190
Proceedings of Feb. 22, 1936 at 735, CLARK PAPERS, supra note 100, box 95.
Sunderland believed that the question of the master’s power to exclude evidence was
“really the difficult part.” Id.
191
See id. (Sunderland suggesting that a “high-class man” could preside over the
deposition).
192
Id.
193
Order, 297 U.S. 731 (1936).
185
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condemned the broad right to conduct a deposition.194 Pepper worried
that a plaintiff might bring a pretextual suit in order to use the Rules to
When Mitchell facetiously
publicly embarrass the defendant. 195
wondered aloud whether Pepper’s fears about public embarrassment
stemmed from Pepper’s time serving on Senatorial committees,196 Pepper
replied “exactly; and that is where I got a taste of the kind of lawlessness
that ruins people’s reputations without the opportunity ever to redress the
harm that is done.”197 In addition to his vehement opposition to a nearly
unlimited right to take a deposition, 198 Pepper also criticized the
motivation behind the Committee’s attempt to make the discovery rules
acceptable to the public. 199 Pepper predicted that the Supreme Court
would never approve of the expanded right to discovery that the
Committee was then inclined to propose.200

194

95

195

See Proceedings of Feb. 22, 1936 at 735-37, CLARK PAPERS, supra note 100, box

Pepper said:
[I]n the part of the country I come from, I know perfectly well that this sort
of power given to a plaintiff is simply going to be used as a means of
ruining the reputation of responsible people. You bring a suit against a man,
without any ground whatever—the president of some important company,
the president of a utilities company or a bank or something. You take his
deposition, have the reporters present, and grill him in the most unfair way,
intimating that he is a burglar or murderer, or this, that, and the other. He
has no redress, and the next morning the papers have a whole lot of frontpage stuff. The case never goes any further. That is all that was intended.
Id. at 735-36.
196
“It is too much like some of these Senate committees you used to sit on.
[Laughter].” Id. at 736.
197
Id.
198
Pepper also remarked:
[T]here is anything worse than the use of judicial proceedings for the
creation of a forum from which, through the newspapers, to harangue the
public. The defendant is perfectly helpless. There is no restraint upon the
examination. This business of getting a high-class man to sit there and
listen in [referring to the possibility of using masters to superintend
depositions] increases the audience for the publication of the slander, but
that is all it does.
Id.
199
Proceedings of Feb. 22, 1936 at 736, CLARK PAPERS, supra note 100, box 95. (“I
do not like the attitude of mind that suggests that the thing to do is to make a vicious
practice sound well or look well.”).
200
Id. (“It seems to me that the whole thing [broad right to taking depositions] is
vicious, and the only reason I am not worried more about it is that I am morally certain
that it will never get by the Supreme Court, I do not care how you dress it up.”).
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Robert Dodge, the Boston lawyer, shifted the topic of discussion to
the courts’ control over the discovery process. 201 Mitchell, still
concerned over the bar’s attitude toward the tentative Rules,202 suggested
that a party should be required to get the court’s permission before taking
a deposition.203 Morgan countered that the Committee should permit a
party to take a deposition as the default rule, but “allow the party who
has been served with the notice, for good cause shown, to prohibit the
taking of the deposition by the adverse party.”204 Lemann replied that
the judge would not have a basis for deciding whether a litigant would be
asking “a lot of improper questions.”205 Mitchell, with the support of
Pepper, then proposed another form of prior restraint on the taking of
depositions, that the judge should be able to specify “the particular things
you are going to be allowed to inquire about” by making “an order
defining the things you can fish about.”206 Sunderland objected because
in New York such orders had led to “an enormous amount of preliminary
litigation, which becomes quite a nuisance.”207
Warren Olney, the San Francisco lawyer, was of the view that the
Committee should not design the rules around the less scrupulous
members of the bar. Drawing on his experience in California, Olney
asserted that the Committee was exaggerating the potential for abuse of
the discovery rules. 208 Olney suggested that, instead of the option of
201
Id. at 736–37. (“In some ways the courts must have control over the proceedings,
and the power to check abuses. I that is more important than any question of references
to a master.”). Dodge went on to discuss the risks of strikesuits and “nuisance
settlements.” Id. at 737.
202
Id. at 739 (“I think the bar would like it better if you were required to get your
authority [to take a deposition] from the court in advance.”) (emphasis added)).
203
See id. at 737.
204
Proceedings of Feb. 22, 1936 at 737, CLARK PAPERS, supra note 100, box 95.
205
Id. at 738.
206
Id. at 740.
207
Id. Pepper also perceived difficulties in circumscribing the scope of the
examination. He approved of the proposal for the optional appointment of a master, but
he stated: “I do not know by what yardstick the master will measure the relevancy of
questions put, because, by the terms of the proposition, no issue has been framed, and it is
as wide-open as the sky.” Id. at 752-53; See also text accompanying notes 128–130,
supra. Pepper doubted the feasibility of restricting the scope of the examination to those
matters relevant to the pleadings because “the complaint may be full of matter which,
upon motion, will be stricken out as scandalous and impertinent, but this deposition will
take place before there is ever a chance to make such a motion as that.” Proceedings of
Feb. 22, 1936 at 753, CLARK PAPERS, supra note 100, box 95.
208
Id. at 742. (“[In California] [t]here is the very freest right out there to take the
deposition of an adverse party, and has been ever since I can remember. It is not abused
in the way in which it has been described here that there is fear that it might be.”).
Furthermore, Olney remarked that even though there were “members of the bar” who had
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requesting the appointment of a master, a party should have the right to
apply to the court to terminate the deposition if the procedure was being
used for an improper purpose, such as harassment.209
At the end of the debate over Sunderland’s draft of tentative Rule
30(c), the Committee voted to instruct Sunderland to revise the rule in
two respects. First, the option of having a master with the power to rule
on the admissibility of evidence would be available only in the case of a
deposition of an adverse party. Second, in the case of a deposition at
which a master did not preside, a party that alleged abuse would be able
to apply to the court to “correct the situation” and to have the right to
take a deposition “checked or limited.”210
In May 1936 the Advisory Committee distributed the Preliminary
Draft of the Rules 211 “to the Bench and Bar for criticism and
suggestions.”212 Sunderland’s revised version of the proposal to provide
for a master to supervise a deposition – Rule 30(c) in the Committee’s
Tentative Draft II213 – appeared as Rule 32(b) in the publicly circulated
Preliminary Draft.214
2. Private and Public Criticism of the Liberal Right to Discovery in
the Rules
The Committee received correspondence from lawyers and
associations of lawyers in response to the Preliminary Draft. The Clark
Papers include two bound volumes of these suggestions, dating from the
period between June and December 1936.215

“no scruples in the world, and they live very largely, to be plain, by blackmail,” lawyers
in California “have not had this particular trouble.” Id. at 744.
209
Proceedings of Feb. 22, 1936 at 756, CLARK PAPERS, supra note 100, box 95. A
version of Olney’s suggestion would become FED. R. CIV. P. 30(d) (1938). See Appendix
A, infra.
210
Proceedings of Feb. 22, 1936 at 760-62, CLARK PAPERS, supra note 100, box 95.
211
PRELIMINARY DRAFT, supra note 104, at iv.
212
Id. at iv.
213
See infra Appendix A.
214
See id. at 60–61 (reprinted at Appendix A, infra).
215
See 13 Preparatory Papers, CLARK PAPERS, supra note 100, box 101
(“Suggestions on the Preliminary Draft of Rules of Civil Procedure: Received from Local
Committees, District Court Committees, Circuit and District Judges, Members of the Bar,
and others. June-December 1936. A – G”); 14 Preparatory Papers, CLARK PAPERS,
supra note 100, box 102 (“Suggestions on the Preliminary Draft of Rules of Civil
Procedure: Received from Local Committees, District Court Committees, Circuit and
District Judges, Members of the Bar, and others. June-December 1936. H – Z”). I cite
the page numbers of the correspondence therein because the volumes themselves are not
consecutively paginated.
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The majority of the comments regarding the discovery rules were
negative.
Most writers focused on the then Rule 31, entitled
“Depositions; Their Form; Purposes; Scope; Use and Effect; Costs”. The
writers feared “fishing expeditions”216 in which litigants would be able to
annoy adversaries217 and might be tempted to concoct false evidence.218
One commentator speculated that adopting the Rules would increase the

216

See, e.g., Letter from E. J. Marshall of Marshall, Melhorn and Marlar, Toledo,
Ohio (July 31, 1936) at 1 in 14 Preparatory Papers, supra note 214 (“Your Committee
understands ‘discovery’ to include fishing expeditions.”). Marshall was vehement in his
objections:
You [William D. Mitchell] and perhaps I might be decent and reasonable in
the taking of depositions but keep in mind that you are setting up a
procedure to be used by every crook and shyster who has a license to
practice law and you dare not assume that they will be decent . . . .

I can see that one, such as my good friend Sunderland, who has
spent his life in the cloister, reading and teaching the Canons of
Ethics might honestly believe that the proposed procedure would
not be abused if put into the hands of everyday working lawyers,
but I have seen it in actual operation and know what will happen.
I am not guessing. I am not reading the answer in the stars . . . .
I insist that the court must have the full, unfettered control and
regulation of all proceedings from the beginning to the end and
your draft of rules should so provide in words of one syllable that
no one can misunderstand.
Id. at 2–3.
217
See, e.g., Letter from the Committee of the Bar of the Southern District of
Alabama (Aug. 14, 1936) at 6, in 13 Preparatory Papers, supra note 214 (the rule
permitting unlimited discovery (Rule 31 in PRELIMINARY DRAFT, see Appendix A)
“seems to us to be highly vexatious in this particular and in all likelihood would result in
every case in a preliminary fishing expedition and then a trial”). The State Bar of
California advocated for the elimination of Rule 31(c):
We do not believe that a party to an action should have the right to go on a
fishing expedition and call in as witnesses in a deposition any person who
he may think can shed any light on the subject and thereby discommode
persons not interested in the particular litigation. . . . . The fishing permitted
is on entirely too great a body of water.
State Bar of California Committee Report (Aug. 10, 1936) at 1, 2, in 13 Preparatory
Papers, supra note 214.
218
See, e.g., Letter from John H. Cantrell of Spielman, Cantrell & McCloud,
Oklahoma City (July 23, 1936) at 2, in 13 Preparatory Papers, supra note 214 (“To
make it too easy to engage in ‘fishing expeditions’ creates the temptation upon the part of
an over-zealous advocate to fabricate evidence to contravene and destroy the evidence of
the opponent”).
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likelihood of suits intended to prepare for larger lawsuits. 219 Even
commentators who were avowed supporters of expanded discovery
believed that the Advisory Committee’s preliminary draft permitted
overly expansive discovery.220
A group of insurance executives provided a comprehensive critique
of the discovery rules.221 They reasoned that by permitting depositions
of both parties and non-parties, and by permitting depositions to be taken
for the dual purposes of discovery and for use as evidence (or both), the
proposed rules would result in “obvious fishing expedition expeditions”
and promote “other evils.”222
The Association did not believe that the protections offered by Rule
32(b) were adequate. The Association recommended, instead, that
inquiry should be limited to any matter that was “material and necessary”
to the pending action, rather than merely “relevant.”223 The Association
further suggested that the appointment of a master, which was an option
219
Comments by New York Court of Appeals Judge Edward R. Finch at ABA
Meeting in Boston (Aug. 28, 1936) at 1, in 13 Preparatory Papers, supra note 214 (“A
person asserting a claim should not be given all the advantages here proposed unless at
the same time the rights of defendants are adequately safeguarded.”); Id. at 3 (noting that
strikesuits to prepare for a larger law suit “will be greatly encouraged by the adoption of
the preliminary draft”). Finch believed that the expanded discovery devices under the
Rules would harm both plaintiffs and defendants. Unless the federal courts adopted a
loser-pays system, defendants would be forced to pay for the settlement of “so-called
speculative litigation” because it would be cheaper than resisting, and a poor plaintiff
would be forced by a wealthy defendant “to accept an unfair settlement [for a meritorious
claim]” because of the great expense of discovery. Edward R. Finch, Some Fundamental
and Practical Objections to the Preliminary Draft of the Rules of Civil Procedure for the
District Courts of the United States, 22 A.B.A. J. 809, 810–11 (1936).
220
See, e.g., Letter from Charles A. Beardsley of Fitzgerald, Abbot & Beardsley,
Oakland, CA (June 19, 1936) at 2, in 13 Preparatory Papers, supra note 214.
(“Personally I am a firm believer in the liberalization of the rules of evidence, but it
seems to me that these provisions [Rule 31] are entirely too liberal.”)
221
Letter from Association of Casualty and Surety Executives (received by the
Advisory Committee on Oct. 8, 1936) at 1–3, in 13 Preparatory Papers, supra note 214.
222
Id. at 1. The “evils” included: perpetuating “blackmail and extortion”; facilitating
“strike suits for the purpose of unearthing evidence to form the basis of large lawsuits”;
incentivizing plaintiff’s lawyers “to ‘find’ witnesses to offset the testimony given by
defendants’ known witnesses”; allowing plaintiffs to obtain, without cost to themselves,
records of companies that “may have been acquired by the defendant at great expense”;
threatening to waste executives’ time in order to “demand and possibly obtain much
higher amounts in settlement than is now the case”; and the risk of champerty because
“an unscrupulous attorney for a nominal plaintiff could use this device to obtain the
names and addresses of possible serious cases and thus contact those persons, in which
event the procedure would . . . stimulate litigation instead of reducing it.” The
Association claimed that the rules overly disfavored the defendant because the plaintiff
might have no records and could claim not to know of any witnesses. Id. at 1–2.
223
Id. at 2.
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under Rule 32(b) only if the court granted a party’s request for such an
appointment, should be a mandatory feature of deposition practice.224
Still other commentators recommended revisions to Rule 32(b).
One commentator objected to the Rule 32(b) master’s power entirely to
exclude evidence. Tenth Circuit Judge George T. McDermott wrote that
the master should preserve the substance of inadmissible testimony,
unless it was privileged.225 The Federal Bar Association of New York,
New Jersey, and Connecticut suggested that the Committee should call
the person authorized to hold the examination under Rule 32(b) a
“commissioner” because a “master reports findings and makes
recommendations.” 226 A lawyer from Ohio, E. J. Marshall, suggested
that the court should have the power to issue protective orders or
terminate a deposition taken in bad faith.227 His arguments were similar
to those that Olney had made at the Committee’s February 1936
meeting.228
The compilation229 of all the comments that the Committee received
on the May 1936 Preliminary Draft included only one comment that
advocated eliminating Rule 32(b) entirely.230
According to Edward Hammond, a member of the Committee’s
231
staff, some lawyers worried about who would pay the master’s fee
whereas others expressed concerns about the master’s authority to
224
See id. at 3 (proposing that all examinations “should be made before a competent
and responsible officer, or provision should be made for the determination of objections
by a Judge or properly qualified Referee or Master.”).
225
See Letter from George T. McDermott (Sept. 9, 1936) at 3, in 14 Preparatory
Papers, supra note 214 (“In hearings before masters, I think the substance of Equity Rule
46 should be preserved to the effect that where evidence is offered and excluded, the
court shall preserve the substance thereof, except where the evidence is excluded on the
ground of a privileged communication.”).
226
Federal Bar Ass’n of N.Y., N.J. & Conn. Committee Report (Aug. 25, 1936) at 14,
in 13 Preparatory Papers, supra note 214.
227
Letter from E. J. Marshall of Marshall, Melhorn and Marlar, Toledo, Ohio (July
31, 1936) at 1 in 14 Preparatory Papers, supra note 214 (urging that the Committee
“provide very definitely that the court may make any sort of an order and give any
directions that appear to be proper to regulate and control the taking of the depositions,
and to see that they are fairly taken, or to order that the depositions be not taken.”).
228
See supra text accompanying note 208.
229
See 16 Preparatory Papers, in CLARK PAPERS, supra note 100, box 103
(“Abstracts, Oct. 1935-Jan. 1937”) (including comments and objections to the proposed
Rules).
230
Letter from Russell Wiles (June 19, 1936), in 16 Preparatory Papers, supra note
228. Wiles, a Chicago lawyer, recommended that the Committee eliminate draft Rule
32(b) because allowing a master to exclude evidence at the discovery stage would be
disruptive to the litigation.
231
Report of the Advisory Committee, in PROPOSED RULES, supra note 105, at vii.
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restrict the freedom of discovery.232 In fact, not all the reactions to Rule
32(b) were negative. At an ABA meeting on August 26, 1936, a New
York lawyer, Martin Conboy, lamented that “the proposed rule 31 goes
the full distance in permitting unlimited discovery before trial.”233 In
order to mitigate such broad right to discovery, Conboy urged that “an
oral examination by counsel” should “require the right to judicial
determination of the propriety of any question before answer, particularly
upon the examination of an adverse party.” 234 Conboy recommended
that the judge should play a more active role in controlling the deposition
either directly or by means of a master.235
C. The Committee’s Ultimate Rejection of the Proposal to Provide for a
Master-Supervised Deposition
On October 25, 1936, the Committee voted to strike Rule 32(b)
from the draft Rules. 236 Instead of allowing a party to request that a
judge or master preside over a deposition, the Committee decided to
grant the judge two means of supervisory control. First, the drafters
empowered the court to issue a protective order “upon motion seasonably
made by any party or by any person to be examined and upon notice and
for good cause shown.” 237 Second, the court in which the case was
232

Edward H. Hammond, Some Changes in the Preliminary Draft of the Proposed
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 23 A.B.A. J. 629, 632 (1937). (“There was
considerable objection by the profession to the master rule, particularly to the provision
giving the power to rule on evidence and it was thought that the power to exclude
evidence might be so exercised as to hamper the desired freedom of discovery. The
matter of costs in the way of master’s fees and expenses might also act as a deterrent to
the use of discovery and would give an unfair advantage to those more able to pay
them.”); see also Brazil, supra note 75, at 168 (noting that the papers preserved in the
Clark Papers do not detail the objections to which Hammond referred nor the
Committee’s consideration of them).
233
See Martin Conboy, Depositions, Discovery and Summary Judgments: As Dealt
with in Title V of the Proposed Rules of Civil Procedure for the Federal Courts, 22
A.B.A. J. 881, 883 (1936).
234
Id.
235
Id. at 883–84. (“The rules contain no provision for the exclusion of objectionable
questions before answer, if asked in good faith and in the absence of a master . . . . If
resort to the Federal judges is permitted, perhaps they can prevent abuse of the privilege
[to discovery] by either the interrogator or the objector. Perhaps the judge should have
the power to appoint a master on his own motion, if either objector or interrogator should
be unduly aggressive. Power might even be conferred upon the judge to decide who
should advance the expense of the master in such cases.”).
236
Proceedings of the Advisory Committee (October 25, 1936) at 2, in CLARK
PAPERS, supra note 100, box 96 (notation next to Rule 32(b) (“Depositions Before a
Master”) stating: “It was agreed that 32(b) be stricken out.”).
237
FED. R. CIV. P. 30(b) (1938) (amended 1993), infra, Appendix A.
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pending was permitted, in addition to a number of enumerated options,
“to make any other order which justice requires to protect the party or
witness from annoyance, embarrassment, or oppression.”238
A further means of regulating the deposition was a provision that
“at any time during the taking of the deposition . . . any party or the
deponent” could make a motion to the court for an order to terminate the
taking of the deposition, or to issue a protective order limiting the “scope
and manner of the taking of the deposition.”239 In order to prevail in
seeking such an order, the movant would have to show “that the
examination is being conducted in bad faith, or in such manner as
unreasonably to annoy, embarrass, or oppress the deponent or party.”240
The Rules did not provide for an officer with authority to apply the
rules of evidence during the course of the deposition. With the exception
of evidentiary privileges, the rules of evidence did not limit what an
adversary could discover. The rules of evidence would still regulate
what testimony could be admitted at trial.241
As part of his public-relations effort to the Bar, Mitchell reported in
the American Bar Association Journal that the protections available
under Rules 30(b) and (d) were superior to those that would have been
available under Rule 32(b). 242 In the same journal, Hammond, the
238
Id. Excessive cost was not a basis for seeking a protective order. See Tactical Use
and Abuse of Depositions Under the Federal Rules, 59 YALE L.J. 117, 138 (1949)
(recommending the inclusion of “expense” as a basis for protective orders under Rules
30(b) and (d)).
239
FED. R. CIV. P. 30(d) (1938) (amended 2000), infra, Appendix A.
240
Id. Perhaps to discourage frivolous motions for orders to terminate depositions,
the Rule also provided: “In granting or refusing such order the court may impose upon
either party or upon the witness the requirement to pay such costs or expenses as the
court may deem reasonable.” Id.
241
The Committee decided that, instead of providing for an officer who could
contemporaneously control the deposition, the judge would, at the request of parties,
supervise the discovery process. For one federal judge’s description of the judicial role
under the Rules’ discovery provisions, see Irving R. Kaufman, The Philosophy of
Effective Judicial Supervision Over Litigation, 29 F.R.D. 207, 213 (1962). For a later
assessment of the effectiveness of judicial control over discovery, see Wayne D. Brazil,
Improving Judicial Controls over the Pretrial Development of Civil Actions: Model Rules
for Case Management and Sanctions 6 AM. B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 873 (1981).
242
William D. Mitchell, Some of the Problems Confronting the Advisory Committee
in Recent Months—Commencement of Actions—Effect of Findings of Fact in Cases Tried
by Court Instead of Jury, Etc., 23 A.B.A. J 966, 969 (1937). (“We [the Advisory
Committee] have stricken out the provision that allowed the party to be examined to
demand the appointment of a master to supervise the examination. On the other hand, we
have fortified the provisions for protection against improper examinations and fishing
expeditions. There are now adequate provisions allowing a party or a witness to apply to
the court to limit the scope of the examination or to terminate it entirely if the privilege is
being abused.”)
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Committee staff member, also emphasized that, despite the elimination
of Rule 32(b), more than adequate protections against abusive discovery
remained in the Rules, from the court itself.243
The cost of engaging a master played a significant role in the
Committee’s ultimate rejection of draft Rule 32(b). In addition to
Hammond’s reference in 1937 to such concerns on the part of the bar,244
Mitchell was aware that masters’ costs would affect the feasibility of a
discovery system that employed them. In November 1935, Wickersham
and Dodge both supported the possibility of importing the English
“Summons for Direction” 245 – the English equivalent of a pretrial
conference under Rule 16 – into American pretrial practice. 246 In
response, Mitchell cautioned that Congress would not be willing to
appropriate funds to pay for the standing masters that such a procedure
required.247 In a 1937 article, Mitchell explained that standing masters in
England were civil servants, paid from state funds. “[I]n the United
States the district courts have standing masters, but their compensation is
not paid out of the public treasury, and if their services are used their
compensation must be paid by litigants and it would be out of line with
American ideas to compel the litigants to pay the compensation of a
master conducting pre-trial proceedings.”248
The Advisory Committee did not propose what would have perhaps
been a more effective means of deterring strike suits and preventing
abusive discovery practices: a loser-pays system. At a 1937 American
Bar Association meeting, Mitchell described New York Court of Appeals
Judge Edward Finch’s endorsement of such an approach at the ABA’s

243

Hammond, supra note 231, at 631 (noting that the protection afforded to parties in
the Preliminary Draft “of having the taking of the deposition stopped if it is not being
conducted in good faith or is being conducted for the purpose of annoying, embarrassing
or oppressing a party, has been retained, in improved form, (Old Rule 32(c)) and that
protection has been extended to witnesses. (Rule 30(d))”); see also id. at 632 (“It is
thought that the provisions for the protection of parties and witnesses just mentioned will
afford at least as much protection as was intended to be afforded by the master under the
old rule. Furthermore, that protection will now come directly from the court itself.”).
244
See supra note 231.
245
See supra, note 112 and accompanying text.
246
Proceedings of the Advisory Committee (Nov. 4, 1935) at 252, in CLARK PAPERS,
supra note 100, box 94.
247
Id.
248
Mitchell, supra note 241, at 970. Mitchell reiterated: “[N]o rule can be adopted
which assumes that Congress will appropriate money to pay masters for such service.”
Id. See also Brazil, supra note 75, at 171 n. 190 (“[In American practice] we have no
trained masters”).
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1936 meeting.249 Mitchell explained that the Advisory Committee had
declined to make “any substantial change in the present basis for taxing
costs or disbursements” because any such reform is “a matter for
Congress and not properly embodied in the proposed rules of practice of
procedure.”250 Mitchell suggested that “in places like New York City,”
“where the conditions are admittedly bad and many dishonest actions are
brought in the courts, the rules relating to discovery and examination
before trial offer opportunities to lawyers of low ethical standards,” the
“remedy is an improvement in the machinery for disbarring or
disciplining lawyers guilty of misconduct.” 251 Given the Committee’s
constraints, Mitchell believed that improving the self-regulatory regime
of the legal profession was a better way to prevent abuse of the discovery
system than a loser-pays system.
D. Congressional Testimony Regarding the Relationship Between Jury
Trial and the Discovery Provisions in the Final Draft of the Rules
In 1938 both the House and the Senate Committees on the Judiciary
held hearings on the new Federal Rules.252 Under the Enabling Act, the
Rules would come into force unless the Congress took “affirmative
advance action.”253
249

See supra note 218; Mitchell, supra note 241, at 969 (reporting that Judge Finch’s
“principal suggestion was that the law should punish the plaintiff who brings a strike suit
by requiring him to pay not merely the ordinary costs, but all the expenses of the
defendant, including reasonable counsel fees, if the defense is successful.”) (emphasis
added).
250
Mitchell, supra note 241, at 969.
251
Id.
252
See Rules of Civil Procedure for the United States District Courts: Hearings
Before a Subcomm. of the Comm. on the Judiciary United States Senate, 75th Cong., 3rd
Sess., on S.J. Res. 281, A Joint Resolution To Postpone the Effective Date of the Rules of
Civil Procedure for the District Courts of the United States, Part 2, 75th Cong. 29 (1938)
[hereinafter Senate Hearings]; Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Courts of the
United States: Hearings Before the Comm. on the Judiciary House of Representatives,
75th Cong., 3d Sess., with Regard to The “Rules of Civil Procedure for the District
Courts of the United States,” Adopted by the Supreme Court of the United States
Pursuant to the Act of June 19, 1934 (48 Stat. 1064) and on H.R. 8892, 75th Cong 1
(1938) [hereinafter House Hearings]
253
House Hearings, supra note 252, at 1 (Statement of Hatton W. Summers,
Chairman). In fact, some of the Federal Rules, once enacted, were on at least one
occasion applied to an action pending before the effective date of the Rules. See, e.g.,
Columbia Metaloy Company v. Bank of America (N.D. Cal, Nov. 7, 1938) (Rule 26(a),
permitting taking of depositions without leave of court after answer is filed, applied to
action pending before effective date of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure). Columbia
Metaloy was cited in Decisions on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: From Bulletins
II, III, IV and V Issued by the Department of Justice, 24 A.B.A. J. 984, 986 (1938).
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At the hearing before the Senate Judiciary Committee, two D.C.
lawyers, Challen B. Ellis and Kahl K. Spriggs, testified that the expanded
discovery regime under the new Federal Rules had radical implications
for the right to jury trial under the Seventh Amendment. Ellis noted that,
overall, the Rules established the private exercise of judicial powers:
“These [new] rules put power in the hands of the parties which even in
equity cases are only in the hands of the court.”254 The parties to a suit
could engage in a lengthy discovery process in which each side could
deploy any number of discovery devices, with a limited role for the
judge.
Spriggs argued that the Rules endangered the existence of the jury
trial.
Spriggs submitted to the Senate Judiciary Committee a
memorandum entitled “Analysis of Some of the Rules which Particularly
Affect or Change the Nature of Trial by Jury.”255 In his report, Spriggs
concluded:
In general, the various powers of discretion reposed in the court
under the new rules, together with the power of every litigant to
try the case piecemeal, serve to whittle down the right of trial by
jury. Heretofore the theory has been that a case may be submitted
at one time through the medium of oral testimony and in open
court, except in the infrequent instances in which depositions are
used. Now, by a kind of inquisition conducted under rule 26,
interrogatories under rule 33, discovery under rule 34, and
admission of facts under rule 36, together with the consequences
imminent under rule 37, there is left little further to be done.256

Whereas before the 1938 Rules the right to discovery was a limited right
to gather information that would help a party prepare its case for trial,
Spriggs recognized that, under the Rules, the greatly expanded right to
discovery could eliminate altogether the need for a jury trial.257
Spriggs may have been correct that the rules he alluded to were
intended to reduce the frequency of jury trials. Sunderland, who drafted
254

Senate Hearings, supra note 252, at 42.
Id. at 48.
256
83 CONG. REC. 8481 (June 8, 1938) (memorandum regarding the effect of the
Federal Rules on substantive rights, submitted by Kahl K. Spriggs to Senate Judiciary
Committee). Spriggs’s memo was also submitted to the Committee. See Senate
Hearings, supra note 252, at 52.
257
As Subrin has described, in October 1936, the Patent Section Committee of the
American Bar Association conveyed their concerns to the Advisory Committee that “the
new rules would detract from the essential goal of the Equity Rules to have trials in open
court; [the Patent Section Committee] did not think their concerns were ‘peculiar to the
practice of patent law.’” Subrin, supra note 10, at 731.
255
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the discovery rules that Spriggs criticized, had in 1925 described the civil
jury trial as “the most archaic, cumbersome, expensive and inefficient
means of trying cases that could well be devised.”258 Prior to serving as
Chief Justice, Charles Evans Hughes had also advocated fewer jury
trials, suggesting that jury trials be replaced by bench trials, rather than
by a permissive pretrial discovery regime.259 Notwithstanding criticisms
of the Rules’ discovery provisions, 260 the Rules came into force on
September 16, 1938.261
VI. CONCLUSION
A striking attribute of the American deposition is that opposing
counsel conducts the questioning in the absence of a judicial officer.
Because of the novelty and centrality of the deposition procedure, I have
looked for the origins of the absence of an officer with authority to rule
on evidentiary objections. I have determined that the Advisory
Committee considered providing such an officer in the Rules, but

258
Edson R. Sunderland, Cooperation Between the Bar and the Public in Improving
the Administration of Justice, 1 Ala. L.J. 5, 8 (1925). “If one should deliberately search
for a system of trial which would open the widest door to sympathy, prejudice, chance
and ignorance, I do not know how he could improve on our present jury system.” Id.
259
Do Away With Trial By Jury, Hughes Urges, CHICAGO DAILY TRIBUNE, Dec. 7,
1928 at 11.
260
Ellis testified:
Why should the defendant be required to answer under oath plaintiff’s
claims on penalty of punishment? Why should this be required of the
defendant, when the plaintiff is not even required to state his claim on oath?
Every defendant in a law case is ordinarily permitted to require the plaintiff
to prove his case, and not be required to prove his case for him. Why should
all this be allowed? The facts thus extorted from the defendant may be
“relevant,” although inadmissible as evidence and wholly unnecessary.
Senate Hearing, supra note 252, at 47. Spriggs testified through his memorandum: “Rule
26 goes further, it is believed, toward permitting a ‘fishing expedition’ to be indulged in
concerning matters which may or may not be admissible in evidence than has ever been
sanctioned by Congress in a jury action.” Id. at 51.
261
LETTER FROM THE ATTORNEY GENERAL TRANSMITTING THE “RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES”, ADOPTED BY THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES PURSUANT TO THE ACT OF JUNE 19, 1934, CH.
651, in RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES
(JANUARY 3, 1938 – REFERRED TO THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY AND ORDERED TO BE
Justice Brandeis did not approve of the
PRINTED) at v); see also 83 CONG. REC. 8473.
new Federal Rules. When Chief Justice Hughes transmitted the new Rules to Attorney
General Cummings on December 20, 1937, Hughes wrote in his covering letter: “I am
requested to state that Mr. Justice Brandeis does not approve of the adoption of the
rules.” H.R. DOC. NO. 460 (1938) at v. Subrin has attributed the ultimate acceptability of
the Rules at the hearings to the “brilliance of the advocacy before Congress” by Edgar
Tolman and William Mitchell. See Subrin, supra note 10, at 740–43.
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decided in October 1936 that it would be unworkable to provide an
examinant with the right to request that his examination be supervised by
a master with the power to rule on the admissibility of evidence.262
The modern American deposition traces back to evidence-gathering
methods in equity practice, in which an agent of the court would examine
a witness by administering party-propounded written interrogatories
outside the presence of the parties and of counsel. In mid-nineteenthcentury federal practice, very limited pretrial discovery existed. After
1842, the Federal Equity Rules authorized a party to ask questions of an
adversary, in the presence either of an examiner who merely recorded
testimony or of a master who played a more collaborative role with the
party’s counsel. By the end of the nineteenth century, the examiner
presided over examinations to gather evidence, but had no power to rule
on admissibility.
When the Advisory Committee merged the examination for the
preservation of potential testimony with the examination for discovery,
the lack of existing judicial personnel played a major role in the
Committee’s decision not to provide for an officer to apply the rules of
evidence at the examination itself.263 If standing masters had continued
262

Brazil concludes that federal judges may rely on the judiciary’s “inherent power”
to appoint pre-trial special masters to handle discovery tasks. See generally, Brazil,
supra note 75. Irving Kaufman, a federal judge, has supported the use of masters to
preside at the taking of depositions:
For our purposes, the significance of history lies not in whether the Master
was in fact conceptually regarded as a judge or clerk. It is to be found rather
in the fact that the Master has traditionally been able to dispose of the more
routine and ministerial duties thereby freeing the judge for the more
pressing trial work. Consider, if you will, the most universally accepted
extra judicial officer now employed in this country-the Referee in
Bankruptcy. The Bankruptcy Referee was our response to the burgeoning
bankruptcy business that deluged the courts in the last century. It was
apparent early in our history that to invest exclusive and nondelegable
jurisdiction over the administration of bankruptcy laws in the courts
themselves would seriously impede the effective judicial handling of
equally important matters. The same practical considerations should govern
our discussion today.
Irving R. Kaufman, Use of Masters to Preside at the Taking of Depositions, 22 F.R.D.
465, 467–68 (1958).
263
The establishment of Federal Magistrates in the 1960s could have been an
opportunity to resurrect the Committee’s draft Rule 32(b). Magistrates could have
presided over pretrial depositions. Under the Magistrates Act, magistrates are appointed
to office by the district courts. Section 636(b) of the Act, which is the source of the
magistrate’s civil authority, empowered the magistrate, when authorized by local rule, to
perform such duties “as are not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United
States.” The Act suggested that the magistrate (1) perform the fact-finding function of
the special master as set forth in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, (2) assume the role
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to be in widespread use in the federal system by the time the Advisory
Committee was meeting in the 1930s, there might have been a role for
them under the Federal Rules.264
The evidence-gathering purpose of the examination at equity meant
that all objectionable testimony was recorded. If such testimony were
excluded on the basis of an objection, the judge would not be able, at the
later stage of the litigation, to review the decision to exclude. Because
the deposition under the 1938 Federal Rules also had an evidencegathering function, the same logic dictated that testimony could not be
excluded. The law of evidence plays no role at the pretrial deposition
because no judge is present.
Contemporaries recognized the radical nature of discovery
provisions in the Federal Rules. Some lawyers anticipated that expanded
discovery would displace some trials by clarifying fact issues in the
pretrial process.265 The cost of discovery might also function to promote
settlement. In 1932 Sunderland had alluded to the “widespread fear of
liberalizing discovery” because “hostility to ‘fishing expeditions’ before
trial is a traditional and powerful taboo.”266 By 1947 the Supreme Court
was endorsing wide-ranging discovery:
of pretrial assistant (taking on duties similar to those of the English master) and (3)
review applications for post-trial relief made by individuals convicted of criminal
offenses..
Congress was careful to state, however, that the Act’s enumerated suggestions do
not exhaust the possible duties that the magistrate may perform. The legislative history
of the Act indicates that Congress did not intend to limit the magistrates’ duties to those
enumerated:
Proposed 28 U.S.C. 636(b) mentions three categories of functions
assignable to magistrates under its provisions. The mention of these three
categories is intended to illustrate the general character of duties assignable
to magistrates under the act, rather than to constitute an exclusive
specification of duties so assignable . . . .
Commentary on the Magistrates Act, H.R. REP. NO. 1629 (1968) at 19. See generally,
Linda J. Silberman, Masters and Magistrates Part II: The American Analogue, 50 N.Y.U.
L. REV 1297, 1299–1300 (1975) (describing the possible duties that a magistrate may
perform).
264
For a discussion of post-1938 proposals to establish standing masters, paid from
public funds, to supervise discovery, see Note, Developments in the Law: Discovery, 74
HARV. L. REV. 940, 1006–07 (1961).
265
John Langbein has recently provided an excellent analysis of the vanishing trial in
the United States. Langbein argues that expanded discovery (including, inter alia, the
absence of a judge or judge-like officer from the oral deposition) has rendered trial
obsolete. See Disappearance of Civil Trial, supra note 5, at 546, 572.
266
Edson R. Sunderland, Foreword, in RAGLAND, supra note 81, at iii. In a 1980
survey of 180 civil litigators in Chicago, the most common terms used to describe the
state of discovery was “overdiscovery” and “harassment.” Wayne D. Brazil, Civil
Discovery: Lawyers’ Views of Its Effectiveness, Its Principal Problems and Abuses, 5
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[T]he deposition-discovery rules are to be accorded a broad and
liberal treatment. No longer can the time-honored cry of “fishing
expedition” serve to preclude a party from inquiring into the facts
underlying the opponent’s case. Mutual knowledge of all the
relevant facts gathered by both parties is essential to proper
litigation.267

Amendments to the discovery rules in 1970 and 1993 further
expanded the right to discovery. 268 The mandatory disclosure rules
provided for near-mandatory discovery without requiring a formal
request for discovery.269 The 1938 Advisory Committee’s decision not
AM. B. FOUND. RESEARCH 787, 830-31 (1980). According to one Chicago lawyer,
“discovery is too much of a game to see how much you can hide.” Id. at 824.
267
Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947). It is worth noting that in Hickman
the Supreme Court upheld the attorney work-product doctrine, which protects lawyers’
mental impressions and strategies from discovery:
Historically, a lawyer is an officer of the court and is bound to work for the
advancement of justice while faithfully protecting the rightful interests of
his clients. In performing his various duties, however, it is essential that a
lawyer work with a certain degree of privacy, free from unnecessary
intrusion by opposing parties and their counsel. Proper preparation of a
client’s case demands that he assemble information, sift what he considers
to be the relevant from the irrelevant facts, prepare his legal theories and
plan his strategy without undue and needless interference. That is the
historical and the necessary way in which lawyers act within the framework
of our system of jurisprudence to promote justice and to protect their clients’
interests. This work is reflected, of course, in interviews, statements,
memoranda, correspondence, briefs, mental impressions, personal beliefs,
and countless other tangible and intangible ways-aptly though roughly
termed by the Circuit Court of Appeals in this case as the ‘Work product of
the lawyer.’ Were such materials open to opposing counsel on mere
demand, much of what is now put down in writing would remain unwritten.
An attorney’s thoughts, heretofore inviolate, would not be his own.
Inefficiency, unfairness and sharp practices would inevitably develop in the
giving of legal advice and in the preparation of cases for trial. The effect on
the legal profession would be demoralizing. And the interests of the clients
and the cause of justice would be poorly served.
Id. at 510–11.
The work-product doctrine has yielded attempts to “play games” to which the
Rules sought to put an end. See, e.g., Liesa L. Richter, Corporate Salvation or
Damnation? Proposed New Federal Legislation on Selective Waiver, 76 FORDHAM L.
REV. 129 (2007) (describing attempts by corporations to use selective waiver to cooperate
with the government and yet protect themselves from shareholder derivative suits and
class action securities suits).
268
Advisory Committee’s Statement Concerning Amendments of the Discovery
Rules, 48 F.R.D. 487 (1970); FED. R. CIV. P. 26 (1993).
269
See FED. R. CIV. P. 26 (1993). In his initial draft of the discovery rules, Sunderland
had included a method of forcing an adversary “to furnish adequately descriptive lists of
documents, books, accounts, letters or other papers, photographs, or tangible things,
which are known to him and are relevant to the pending cause or any designated part
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to provide a master to supervise a deposition was a significant, and
overlooked, element in the shaping of modern American civil procedure,
including the displacement of civil trial by pretrial discovery.

APPENDIX A: DRAFTS OF FEDERAL RULES PROVIDING FOR DEPOSITIONS
BEFORE A MASTER
I. Tentative Draft II270 (December 23, 1935 – January 15, 1936)
(unpublished)
Rule 30(c) [Officers Before Whom Depositions May be Taken.
Letters Rogatory]271
If the adverse party, upon being served with a notice of taking a
deposition by oral examination, shall promptly apply to the court
for an order that such deposition be taken before a standing
master of the court or a special master appointed for such
purpose, and shall show in such application special and unusual
circumstances sufficient to satisfy the court that the deposition
cannot be satisfactorily taken before an examiner as provided by
the preceding paragraphs, the court may make such order, and fix
therein the time and place of examination, and may also by the
terms thereof authorize such master to receive or exclude
evidence in all respects as though the evidence were offered
before the court. In such case the master’s fees shall be fixed by
the order and they shall be advanced by the party applying
therefor.

Notes:
The taking of testimony by a master should be the exception
rather than the rule. It is very expensive. Federal equity rules
regarding the use of masters have been widely criticized on
account of the expense. Lane, in 35 Harvard Law Rev. 296-7,

thereof.” Subrin, supra note 10, at 718–19 (quoting Rule 57(a), Tentative Draft No. 1
(Oct. 16, 1935)). This rule did not become a part of the final 1938 Federal Rules.
270
Preparatory Papers: Drafts, Reports and Correspondence used in the Preparation
of the Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Courts of the United States, in CLARK
PAPERS, supra note 100, box 98. “Tentative Draft II” was marked “Confidential – Not
Published.”
271
This version of Rule 30(c) was dated January 13, 1936, following Wickersham’s
proposal for the appointment of a master.
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suggests that these rules “should be eliminated or radically
changed.”
It is questionable whether a master should exercise the power of
excluding evidence in the taking of depositions. In performing
this duty he is not engaged in making findings or giving opinions
by only in taking testimony.
‘A referee appointed merely to take evidence should take all that
is offered and leave it to the court to determine what is not
competent. But if the reference is to report the evidence with the
opinion of the referee as distinguished from a reference merely to
take testimony, the referee is not bound to take testimony which
appears to him to be not relevant to the issue.’ – 53 C.J. [Corpus
Juris] 731.
Common practice in taking depositions on commission does not
involve rulings on evidence by the commissioner. ‘Generally he
(the commissioner) has no authority to determine the competency
of the witness, the propriety of the questions, or the admissibility
of the evidence, but must take down the questions and answers
and not the objections and exceptions for subsequent
determination by the court.’ – 18 C.J. 684.
Modern discovery and deposition procedure makes practically no
use of officers having power to decide objections.

In his Notes above, Sunderland also referred to Ragland’s discovery
Before Trial regarding the Wisconsin and Missouri rules regarding the
powers of the presiding officer at depositions. The drafters of the notes
also cautioned that using a master would be cumbersome with respect to
appeals of the master’s decisions. The drafters cited Dowagiac Mfg. Co.
v. Lochren, in which the auxiliary court refused to compel production of
certain testimony and the appellate court disagreed, but the appellate
court could not consider the rejected evidence and render a final decree
without remanding the case for further proof.272
II. Tentative Draft III (March, 1936) (unpublished)273
Rule 33(b):

272
273

143 F. 211, 214 (8th Cir. 1906).
CLARK PAPERS, supra note 100, Box 98 [Tentative Draft III].
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When notice is served for taking the deposition by oral
examination of any party, or of an officer, director, agent or
employee of any party, the court in which the action is pending
may, on motion promptly made by such party and on good cause
shown, make an order directing that such deposition shall be
taken before a standing master of the court or a special master
appointed for that purpose, and authorizing such master to rule
on the admission of evidence. The order shall fix the master’s
fees and they shall be advanced by the moving party.

Rule 33(c) – if the deposition is not held before a master, the
deponent:
may at any time, on a showing that the examination is being
conducted in bad faith, or for the purpose of oppressing,
annoying or embarrassing the deponent or such party, apply to
the court in which the action is pending, or to the court in the
district where the deposition is being taken, for an order directing
the officer conducting such examination to cease forthwith from
taking the deposition. If such an order is made, the examination
shall proceed thereafter only upon the order of the court in which
the action is pending.”

The drafters indicated in a Note to Rule 33(b) that it is
“substantially” identical to the one in he printed preliminary draft
circulated for comment: “It is introduced as a safeguard on account of the
unlimited right of discovery given by Rule 32 [“Depositions – Their
Form, Purpose, Scope and Effect”].274
III. Preliminary Draft (May, 1936)
The Advisory Committee had this version published in order to
solicit “suggestions by the Bench and Bar.”275
Rule 32(b):
(b) Deposition Before a Master. When notice is served for taking
the deposition by oral examination of any party, or of an officer,
director, agent or employee of any party, the court in which the
action is pending may, on motion promptly made by such party
and on good cause shown, make an order directing that such
deposition shall be taken before a standing master of the court or
274

Id.
PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS OF
THE UNITED STATES AND THE SUPREME COURT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA iii (1936).
275
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a special master appointed for that purpose, and authorizing such
master to rule on the admission of evidence. The order shall fix
the master’s fees and they shall be advanced by the moving
party.276

Note to Rule 32(b):
(b) The provision for reference to a master is for the purpose of
protecting parties from oppression in cases where there is reason
to believe that the examination is likely to include matters not
properly subject to discovery. It is introduced as a safeguard on
account of the unlimited right of discovery given by Rule 31.
Missouri has a somewhat similar provision, by which the party
served with notice for taking depositions, may, in cities of more
than 50,000 population, apply for the appointment of a special
commissioner with the power to rule upon the admission of
evidence. Mo., Rev. Stat. (1929), § 1759.277

Rule 32(c):
(c) Examinations not Conduction in Good Faith May be
Enjoined. When the deposition of a party, or of any officer,
director, agent, or employee of any party, is being taken upon
oral examination, before any officer other than a master, the
deponent or party may at any time, on a showing that the
examination is being conducted in bad faith, or for the purpose of
oppressing, annoying or embarrassing the deponent or such party,
apply to the court in which the action is pending, or to the court
in the district where the deposition is being taken, for an order
directing the officer conducting such examination to cease
forthwith from taking the deposition. If such an order is made,
the examination shall proceed thereafter only upon the order of
the court in which the action is pending.278

IV. Preliminary Draft II (October 22, 1936) (unpublished)279
Rule 32(b), which replaced Rule 33(b) from Tentative Draft III:
Substitute presented by Professor Sunderland at Meeting of
10/22/36. (b) Orders for Protection of Deponents. When notice
is served for taking a deposition by oral examination, the court in
276

Id. at 60–61.
Id. at 61.
278
Id.
279
CLARK PAPERS, supra note 100, box 99 [Preliminary Draft II]. This source is
labeled: “mimeographed after meeting of October 22, 1936.”
277

2013]

The Origins of the Oral Deposition in the Federal Rules

97

which the action is pending may, on application of any party or
any person to be examined, promptly made and on good cause
shown, make an order directing that the deposition shall be taken
before a standing or special master of the court, or before some
designated person, or that certain matters shall not be inquired
into, or that the examination shall be held with no one present
except the parties to the record or their officers or counsel and
that after being sealed the deposition shall be opened only by
order of the court, or make any other order which justice may
require to protect the party or witness from annoyance,
embarrassment or oppression. If an order is made that the
deposition be taken before a master, the order shall fix the fees
and they shall be advanced by the party or witness applying for
the order.

The text of Rule 51(c), “Subpoena,” indicated that as of October
1936 the drafters still contemplated the possibility that a master might
preside over a deposition:
(c) – “Subpoena for Taking Depositions; Place of Examination.
A copy of the notice to take a deposition, as provided in Rule 34,
and proof of service thereof, shall constitute a sufficient
authorization for the issuance of subpoenas for the persons
named therein by the clerk of the district court for the district in
which the deposition is to be taken. He shall not, however, issue
a subpoena commanding the production of books, papers, or
document directed to any such person without an order of the
court, unless the deposition is taken before a master with
authority to rule upon the admission of evidence.280

Charles Clark reported in the minutes to the Advisory Committee’s
meeting of October 25, 1936: “It was agreed that Rule 32(b)
[“Depositions Before Masters”] be stricken out, subject to the agreement
to transfer certain parts of it to (c).”281

280

Id. (emphasis added).
Proceedings of the Advisory Committee (Oct. 22, 1936) at 2, in CLARK PAPERS,
supra note 100, box 96.
281
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V. Preliminary Draft III (December, 1936 – January 1937)
(unpublished)282
In this draft someone has drawn a red line through the text “32(b)
Depositions Before a Master” and indicated that the text of the rule had
been moved to Rule 34 (Oral Examination).
VI. Preliminary Draft (February 1937) (unpublished)283
In this version the drafters eliminated the provision for reference to
a master. They instead included Rule 34(f):
(f) Orders for the Protection of Parties and Deponents:
(1) After notice is served for taking a deposition by
oral examination, the court in which the action is
pending, on motion of any party or of any person to
be examined, seasonably made and upon notice and
good cause shown, may make an order that such
deposition shall not be taken, or that certain matters
shall not be inquired into =, or that the scope of the
examination shall be limited to certain matters, or that
the examination shall be held with no one present
except the parties to the record or their officers or
counsel and that after being sealed the deposition
shall be opened only by order of the court, or that
secret processes, developments, or research need not
be disclosed or that the parties shall simultaneously
file specified documents or information enclosed in
sealed envelopes to be opened as directed by the
court, or may make any other order which justice may
require to protect the party or witness from
annoyance, embarrassment or oppression.
(2) At any time, during the taking of the deposition,
on motion of any party or the deponent, and upon a
showing that the examination is being conducted in
bad faith, or for the purpose of oppressing, annoying
or embarrassing the deponent or party, the court in
which the action is pending, or the court in the district
where the deposition is being taken, may make an
order directing the officer conducting such
282

CLARK PAPERS, supra note 100, box 100 [Preliminary Draft III]. This bound
volume also contains “Notes and Reporter’s Comments.”
283
Id.
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examination to cease forthwith from taking the
deposition. If such order is made, the examination
shall proceed only upon the order of the court in
which the action is pending.

VII. Proposed Rules (April 30, 1937) (published)
When the Advisory Committee published its April 30, 1937 report
to the Supreme Court, the drafters transferred the text of Rule 34(f)(1) to
Rule 30(b), “Orders for the Protection of Parties and Deponents.”284 The
Committee also transferred the text of Rule 34(f)(2) to Rule 30(d),
“Motion to Terminate Examination.” 285 The Advisory Committee
included the following Note:
Note to subdivisions (b) and (d). These are introduced as a
safeguard for the protection of parties and deponents on account
of the unlimited right of discovery granted by Rule 26.286

The April 1937 version of Rule 28, “Persons Before Whom Depositions
May be Taken,” no longer included the option of requesting that a master
preside.287
VIII. Final Draft of the 1938 Rules288
Rule 30(b):
(b) Orders for the Protection of Parties and Deponents. After
notice is served for taking a deposition by oral examination, upon
motion seasonably made by any party or by the person to be
examined and upon notice and for good cause shown, the court in
which the action is pending may make an order that the
deposition shall not be taken, or that it may be taken only at some
designated place other than that stated in the notice, or that it may
be taken only on written interrogatories, or that certain matters
shall not be inquired into, or that the scope of the examination
shall be limited to certain matters, or that the examination shall
284
Rule 30, CLARK PAPERS, supra note 100, box 100 [Report of the Advisory
Committee to the Supreme Court of the United States, April 30, 1937]; REPORT OF THE
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES FOR CIVIL PROCEDURE APPOINTED BY THE SUPREME
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES CONTAINING PROPOSED RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR
THE DISTRICT COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES 76–81 (1937). Rule 30(b), supra. at 76–77.
285
Id. at 78
286
Id. at 81
287
See Rule 28, id. at 75–76.
288
H.R. DOC. NO. 460 (1938). This pamphlet was published in 1938 without the
Advisory Committee’s Notes.
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be held with no one present except the parties to the record or
their officers or counsel, or that after being sealed the deposition
shall be opened only by order of the court, or that secret
processes, developments, or research need not be disclosed, or
that the parties shall simultaneously file specified documents or
information enclosed in sealed envelopes to be opened as
directed by the court; or the court may make any other order
which justice requires to protect the party or witness from
annoyance, embarrassment or oppression.289

Rule 30(d):
(d) Motion to Terminate or Limit Examination. At any time
during the taking of the deposition, on motion of any party or the
deponent and upon a showing that the examination is being
conducted in bad faith, or in such manner as unreasonably to
annoy, embarrass, or oppress the deponent or party, the court in
which the action is pending or the court in the district where the
deposition is being taken may order the officer conducting the
examination to cease forthwith from taking the deposition, or
may limit the scope and manner of the taking of the deposition as
provided in subdivision (b). If the order made terminates the
examination, it shall be resumed thereafter only upon the order of
the court in which the action is pending. Upon demand of the
objecting party or deponent, the taking of the deposition shall be
suspended for the time necessary to make a motion for an order.
In granting or refusing such order the court may impose upon
either party or upon the witness the requirement to pay such costs
or expenses as the court may deem reasonable.290

APPENDIX B: THE HISTORICAL ORIGINS OF PARTY-DIRECTED ORAL
EXAMINATION: ONTARIO
Background
In 1837, the legislature of Upper Canada (Ontario) established a
Court of Chancery. 291 The Act stated that the court’s powers would
include the authority to “ . . . compel the discovery of concealed papers
or evidence, or such as may be wrongfully withheld from the party
claiming the benefit of the same . . . .”292 The procedure provided for
289
290
291
292

Id. at 39.
Id. at 40.
An Act to Establish a Court of Chancery in this Province, 7 Wm. IV c. 2 (U.C.).
Court of Chancery Act, s. 2.
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oral witness testimony and examination by counsel in the presence of the
Vice Chancellor or of a Master.293 These provisions predated the 1852
English reform of Chancery, which provided that parties could present
evidence orally or by affidavit.294 The statute provided that an Examiner
would conduct oral examinations, rather than the judge at the hearing
itself.295 Peter Fraser has speculated that the Ontario Act establishing the
Court of Chancery “was perhaps inspired by a Nova Scotia statute of
1833, permitting its Court of Chancery to have examination of witnesses
viva vice before the Court.”296
The new oral method of discovery was short-lived initially.297 In
practice, oral examinations for discovery in Upper Canada occurred
before a Special Master or Special Examiner rather than before the ViceChancellor. 298 W.D. Gwynne, writing in the 1890s, criticized
contemporary examiners: “Folio after folio of evidence is inserted in
almost every brief, whose only end is to lengthen the examiner’s bill.”299
Gwynne also narrated the developments in the procedure for oral
examination for discovery beginning with the establishment of the Court
of Chancery in Ontario in 1837. 300 Due to deficiencies among the
293

Id., s. 5.
An Act to Amend the Practice and Course of Proceeding in the High Court of
Chancery, 15 & 16 Vict. C. 86 (1852).
295
Id., s. 31.
296
PETER FRASER, DISCOVERY OF FACT IN ONTARIO AND BRITISH COLUMBIA (LL.M.
Thesis, University of Toronto 1970) 27. See An Act for Amending the Practice of the
Court of Chancery and Diminishing the Expenses Thereof, 3 Wm. IV c. 52, s. 12 (N.S.)
cited in SIR CHARLES TOWNSHEND, THE HISTORY OF THE COURT OF CHANCERY IN NOVA
SCOTIA (1900) 89-91. Townsend remarked: “The process of the process of the Court is
simplified in respect to execution of decrees, and a settled mode of procedure ratified by
statute, and I should think a very great improvement was made in allowing witnesses to
be examined viva voce in Court. Hitherto the practice was to have them examined by
means of interrogatories before examiners, which can never be as satisfactory as in open
Court.” CHANCERY IN NOVA SCOTIA at 91.
297
The oral examination would return in 1850.
298
See W.D. Gwynne, The Special Examiners, 15 CAN. L. TIMES 221, 223 (1895)
(“ . . . it appears to have been customary to obtain an order for the examination of country
witnesses before a master extraordinary, instead of going to the expense of bringing them
up to town.”).
299
W.D. Gwynne, The Special Examiners, 15 CAN. L. TIMES 221, 221 (1895).
300
Id. at 223-226. Gwynne leveled four criticisms at the contemporary discovery
procedure:
The system is abused in four ways:
(1) By examining counsel exceeding the limits of proper
discovery.
(2) By cross-examining counsel going into unnecessary matters
and at undue length.
(3) By want of careful preparation by counsel.
294
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Masters, the Court of Chancery replaced its innovative procedure for oral
examination with the traditional system of examining witnesses using
written interrogatories.301 Under the latter procedure, the parties’ counsel
exchanged interrogatories and cross-interrogatories prior to the
examination; each party was entitled to fourteen days’ notice from the
opposing party before the examination.302
The Upper Canada Chancery Commission
The next step in the reform of discovery procedure occurred as a
result of the union between Upper and Lower Canada in 1841. After the
union, the Legislative Council of Canada “directed the removal of the
Court of Chancery” to Kingston although the Court of King’s Bench
continued to be located in Toronto.303 On January 1, 1842 the ViceChancellor ordered that all solicitors who practice before the Court of
Chancery must specify “an agent residing in the Town or Township of
Kingston . . . ” for service of documents.304 Many in the Ontario legal
community were unhappy with the relocation of the court. In response,
in November 1842 a group of prominent lawyers, led by then-Treasurer
of the Law Society of Upper Canada and former judge Levius Peters
Sherwood and Attorney-General W.H. Draper, agreed to lobby the
Governor-General, urging that the Court of Chancery remain
permanently situated in Toronto. 305 Moreover, the Ontario bar
association objected to the fact that Vice-Chancellor, Robert Sympson
Jameson, had been appointed Speaker of the first Legislative Council of
Canada; the bar objected to “the union of legislative and judicial duties in
the same person.”306

(4) By giving uncontrolled liberty to the witness.
Id. at 227.
301
See Chancery Order LXXIV (Upper Canada), Dec. 23rd, 1839 (noting that the
contemporary method of examining witnesses may lead to the introduction of improper
testimony and re-introducing the written interrogatory as a means of eliciting evidence).
The Order also required that all objections, “either to the interrogatories or depositions,
shall be taken, not at the time of the examination, but after publication.”
302
Id. In 1840 the notice was increased to twenty-eight days. See Chancery Order
LXXVI (Upper Canada), Aug. 25th, 1840.
303
WILLIAM RENWICK RIDDELL, THE BAR AND THE COURTS OF THE PROVINCE OF
UPPER CANADA, OR ONTARIO 188 (1928).
304
Id. at 189.
305
Id. The group emphasized that the law library, courtrooms and offices already
existed in Toronto.
306
Id. For this proposition Riddell cites Minute Book, Law Society of Upper Canada,
No. 2, 363 et seq.
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In response to the Ontario bar’s complaints, the Parliament of
Upper and Lower Canada appointed a Commission of Enquiry to
examine the rules and procedures of the Court of Chancery. 307 The
Commission was appointed on July 20, 1844 and included both the Chief
Justice and the Senior Puisne Judge of the Court of Queen’s Bench, as
well as prominent Chancery Counsel: Henry John Boulton, Robert
Easton Burns, William Hume Blake, James C. Palmer Esten. 308 The
Commission reported in April, 1845 and in January, 1846.309 In 1849,
the Legislature passed An Act for the More Effectual Administration of
Justice in the Court of Chancery of the Late Province of Upper-Canada,
which incorporated the Commission’s reports.310
In their 1845 report, the Commissioners had issued the following
“quite daring” 311 recommendation, proposing a system of oral
examination before trial three years before the Field Code:
That the Plaintiff and Defendant shall be respectively permitted
to examine each other, viva voce, by Counsel,—the one upon the
matters stated in his bill, and the other upon the answer; such
examinations to be conducted at nisi prius before the Judge
presiding . . .
It will be requisite to provide for restraining the examination
within proper bounds as to relevancy, leading questions, &c. for
the method of taking down, settling and authenticating the
answers . . . .
If we can, by proper regulations, prevent the proposed mode of
examination by Counsel viva voce in an open Court from
occasioning delay, we think great advantage will be gained by
such a manner of eliciting the truth.312

307

at 67.

See Journals of the Legislative Assembly of the Province of Canada, No. 3, 1843,

308
See 12 Vic. c. 64, s. 11 (May 30th, 1849); 3 PROVINCIAL STATUTES OF CANADA
(1849) 399-400; Riddell, 195n20.
309
12 Vic. c. 64, s. 11
310
Id.; 3 PROVINCIAL STATUTES OF CANADA (1849) 397-402. See Riddell at 195n20
(“Much of the [b]ill passed in 1849 was the outcome of their reports”).
311
FRASER, DISCOVERY OF FACT, at 31.
312
Commissioner’s report (cited in Fraser at 31; ORIGINAL REPORT in Manuscript
and Archives, SML, and to be consulted – the report is unpaginated and consists of an
appendix to the Journal of the Legislative Assembly of the Province of Canada). The
reference to truth-generation is striking because most twentieth-century Anglo-American
commentators expressed great concern over the potential for perjury in pretrial oral
examinations, so much so that many opposed a liberal pretrial discovery regime on the
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According to Stephen Subrin, New York’s Field Code of 1848 was
“the biggest systemic procedural change in the United States, after the
adoption of common law systems.”313 The Code provided for pre-trial
depositions of adverse parties, but such an examination was a substitute
for testimony at trial.314 Moreover, the deposition under the Field Code
took place “before a judge of the court or a county judge” who would
rule on objections.315 The Field Code presumed that the pleadings would
properly frame the issues in the case and did not include any
interrogatory provisions. 316 Although the Field Code itself did not
restrict the scope of the pretrial examination, “New York lawyers even
after the adoption of the code were restricted by the traditional idea that
in Chancery the right of a party to a discovery did not extend to all facts
material to the issue, but was limited to such material facts as were
necessary to establish his cause of action or defense.”317
The Commissioners noted that, with respect to the defendant, the
innovation “goes no further than the substituting one mode of
examination for another.” With respect to the plaintiff, however:
the change is far greater, for it is [sic] not hitherto been allowed
in Equity to examine the Plaintiff at all. In regard to the matters
charged in his bill; nor has the plaintiff . . . .

Conscious of the ambitious nature of their recommendation, the
Commissioners continued:

grounds that it would suborn false testimony. See GORDON D. CUDMORE, CHOATE ON
DISCOVERY, 2d ed. at 1-1 to 1-2 (1993).
313
Stephen N. Subrin, Fishing Expeditions Allowed: The Historical Background of
the 1938 Federal Discovery Rules, 39 B.C. L. REV. 691, 696 (1998). For background on
David Dudley Field himself, see Stephen N. Subrin, David Dudley Field and the Field
Code: A Historical Analysis of an Earlier Procedural Vision, 6 L. & HIST. REV. 311, 31327 (1988). For a detailed narrative of the enactment of the Field Code, see Mildred V.
Coe and Lewis W. Morse, Chronology of the Development of the David Dudley Field
Code, 27 CORNELL L. Q. 238 (1942). Field’s own reflections on the legacy of his reforms
can be found in David Dudley Field, Law Reform in the United States and its Influence
Abroad, 25 AM. L. REV. 515 (1891).
314
(1848) N.Y. Laws, c. 379 (71st Sess., April 12, 1848) [hereinafter “1848 Field
Code”] § 345. The examination would be taken “subject to the same rules of
examination, as any other witness.” Id. § 344.
315
Id.
316
Subrin, Field and the Field Code, supra note 313, at 332.
317
Martin Conboy, Depositions, Discovery and Summary Judgments: As Dealt with in
Title V of the Proposed Rules of Civil Procedure for the Federal Courts, 22 A.B.A. J.
881, 882 (1936). By the end of the nineteenth century the Field Code had been adopted
by about half the states. Subrin, supra note 79, at 939.
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We do not recommend this change without hesitation. Its merely
being a departure from the English system, in a very essential
point, has lead us to apprehend, that objections and
inconveniences which cannot readily be foreseen, may discover
themselves in practice . . . .
We are at present, however, of opinion, that an experiment
should be made of this system, as it affords a promise of doing
something effectual, towards bringing the expences [sic] of a suit
in Chancery, within reasonable bounds, by the only means by
which it can be accomplished,—that is, by shortening and
simplifying the proceedings.318

The Ontario Chancery Rules
The 1849 legislation that empowered the judges of the Court of
Chancery to make its own rules specifically authorized them to
promulgate rules that implemented the oral examination:
[A]nd whereas it is desirable that the suggestions of the said
Commissioners, in regard to shortening the bill and answer, and
enabling the Plaintiff to obtain discovery through the medium of
a viva voce examination of the Defendant, and for extending a
like privilege to the Defendant in relation to the viva voce
examination of the Plaintiff, should be adopted; and whereas it is
believed that the adoption of the above suggestion, the abolition
of all unnecessary proceedings, and enabling matters to advance
uninterruptedly in the Master’s Office, will greatly tend to
diminish the costs of proceedings in the said Court, and to
promote the ends of Justice, but it is nevertheless expedient for
the purpose of more conveniently and safely carrying out these
and other alterations, that power should be vested in the Judges to
be appointed under this Act, to make such rules and orders
respecting the pleadings and practice of the said Court, for the
318

Id. The recommendation also included reducing the Plaintiff’s bill to:
a mere statement of his case, setting forth concisely the facts necessary to shew his claim
to the relief prayed, and ending with a suitable prayer for relief,—not inserting any
matters which are mere evidence of facts nor any interrogatories for the purpose of
obtaining a discovery from the Defendant’s answer; that the Defendant may, in his turn,
demur or plead the bill as heretofore, but if he answers, he must confine his answer to the
mere setting forth of his defence, inserting nothing more than is strictly necessary to a
precise and intelligible statement of the matter on which he relies; and that anything
beyond these statements in the bill or answer, shall be deemed impertinent, and be
expunged or disallowed on taxation.
Chancery Commissioners’ Report.

106

SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW

[Vol. 10:43

purpose of carrying out the aforesaid suggestion, as well as such
others as to them may seem expedient for the purposes
mentioned in the hereinbefore recited Commission, and for
amending or modifying any of the rules or orders, which have
been or may be made for that purpose, and for regulating the
Offices of Master and Registrar of the said Court of Chancery, as
well as for rescinding the said rules and orders, or any of
them . . . 319

The legislature thus emphasized both the reduction in litigants’
costs as well as the promotion of justice.
The enacting clause of the 1849 legislation stated:
Be it therefore enacted, That [sic] it shall be lawful for the Judges
to be appointed under this Act for the time being, to make such
rules and orders as to them may seem expedient, for regulating
the Offices of Master and Registrar of the said Court of
Chancery, and for the carrying into effect the recommendations
of the said Commissioners as aforesaid, and from time to time to
make other rules and orders, amending, altering or rescinding the
same, or any of them, and also to make all such rules and orders
as to them may seem meet, for the purpose of adapting the
proceedings of the said Court of Chancery to the circumstances
of this Province, as well in regard to the Process and Pleadings,
as in the practice and proceedings of the said Court, and more
especially the taking, publishing, using and hearing of testimony
in any suit therein pending, or the examination of all, or any of
the parties to any such suit upon their oaths, viva voce or
otherwise, including also the power to regulate by rules or orders,
the allowance and amount of costs . . . 320

In 1850 the judges of the Court of Chancery promulgated Orders
that established the rules regarding oral examination before trial. Order L
stated:
Any party to a suit may be examined as a witness by the party
adverse in point of interest, or by any one of several parties
adverse in point of interest, without any special order for that
purpose: and may be compelled to attend and testify in the same
manner upon the same terms, and subject to the same rules of
examination as any other witness, except as hereinafter provided.
319

12 Vic. c. 64, s. 11.
Id. The Act included a proviso that “no such rule or order shall have the effect of
altering the principles or rules of decision of the said Court . . . ,” i.e. the procedural
changes could not affect or undermine the substantive law.
320
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And any person, for whose immediate benefit a suit is prosecuted
or defended, though not a party to the record, may be regarded as
a party for the purpose of this order.321

Order LVII authorized cross-examination. “Evidence taken under Order
L. may be rebutted by adverse testimony.”322 Any party that had been
examined under Order L could testify on his own behalf “in relation to
any matter respecting which he has been examined in chief.”323
Furthermore, Order LIII abolished interrogatories, replacing them
with the party-conducted or lawyer-conducted deposition. Notably, the
Order applied to both witnesses and parties:
No written interrogatories for the examination of either witnesses
or parties, either before or after decree, shall henceforth be filed,
except by direction of the Court; such examinations shall be viva
voce, and may be conducted either by the parties, their solicitors
or counsel.324

Under Order LVIII, “any party refusing or neglecting to attend at
the time and place appointed for his examination under Order L. may be
punished as for contempt . . . .”325
The new rules provided more flexibility than the previous practice.
For example, “previous to the new rules . . . it was only under the most
special circumstances, and indeed very rarely, that a witness could be
recalled.” 326 Order LX, in contrast, provided that a witness might be
recalled to be examined before the Court after publication if the Master
Extraordinary erred in his examination of the examinant.327

321
ROBERT COOPER, THE RULES AND PRACTICE OF THE COURT OF CHANCERY OF UPPER
CANADA, COMPRISING THE ORDERS OF 1850 AND 1851, WITH EXPLANATORY NOTES
REFERRING TO THE ENGLISH ORDERS AND DECISIONS 61 (1851). Order L preserved the
common law adversarial structure within the discovery process:
Provided always that, where it shall appear upon the hearing that any party examined
under this Order is united in interest with the examining party, the evidence so taken shall
not be used on behalf of either the examining party, or of the examinant, but may be
struck out on the hearing at the instance of any party affected thereby.
322
Id. at 62.
323
Id.
324
Chancery Order LIII, RULES AND PRACTICE OF THE COURT OF CHANCERY OF UPPER
CANADA at 54.
325
Chancery Order LVIII, Id.
326
Id. at 63.
327
See Chancery Order LX. Gwynne was more impolitic: “to guard against the
dangers of arising from the incompetence of the country examiners, it was provided that
a witness might be recalled after publication on special order.” Gwynne, supra note 299
at 224.
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Further Ontario Developments
In 1856, Ontario adopted the English Common Law Procedure Act
(1854), allowing for written interrogatories in the common law courts.
Oral examination for discovery continued to be available in Ontario’s
Court of Chancery. (There was therefore one court (Chancery) in which
the only mode of discovery was by oral examination and one court
(Common Law) in which the only mode of discovery was by written
interrogatories.) The Administration of Justice Act of 1873 extended the
availability of oral discovery to the common law courts, and amendments
in 1877 permitted litigants to examine “any party adverse in point of
interest . . . touching the matters in question in the action.”328 Common
law litigants were required to seek an order to obtain oral discovery, but
such orders were “issued as of course.”329
When the Administration of Justice Act of 1873 introduced oral
examination for discovery to the common law courts of Ontario.330 Eight
comments regarding the Justice Act appeared in the Canada Law Journal;
two pertained to the discovery provisions. Ontario’s experience with
oral examination for discovery most likely explains the dearth of
reaction.331
Ontario’s Judicature Act was passed in 1881. By 1887 a set of
consolidated rules combining equity and common law procedures was
introduced, which expressly provided for the oral examination of an
adverse party without a court order.332
Rule 487 under the Consolidated Rules (1887) provided:
Any party to an action or issue whether plaintiff or defendant, or
in the case of a body corporate, anyone who is or has been one of
the officers of such body corporate, may without any special
Order for the purpose be orally examined before the trial
touching the matters in question in the action by any party
adverse in point of interest; and may be compelled to attend and
328
CUDMORE, supra note 312, at 1-4 to 1-5; Leitch v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co., 13 Ont.
P.R. 369, 379-380 (1890). Also in 1877, revisions to the Common Law Procedure Act
permitted parties to hold the examination before a Special Examiner or local Master in
Chancery without an order, instead of holding the examination before a judge.
329
Menzies v. McLeod, 34 O.L.R. 572, 573 (1915).
330
Stat. Ont., 36 Vict. c. 8.
331
See Note, Administration of Justice Act, 9 CAN. L. JOURNAL 109, 111 (1873) (“The
clauses for the examination of parties, &c. we do not stay to examine in detail, but
recognize their great value, and similar powers have worked well in Chancery
Procedure.”).
332
A party could be examined on any matter “touching the matters in question in the
action.” See Fraser at 41.
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testify in the same manner, upon the same terms, and subject to
the same rules of examination as any witness except as
hereinafter provided.333

From 1887 to the 1980s there were no significant changes to the
rules regarding examination for discovery.

333

Rule 496 authorized cross-examination.

